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THROWING THE RED FLAG ON THE 
COMMISSIONER:  HOW INDEPENDENT 
ARBITRATORS CAN FIT INTO THE NFL’S OFF-
FIELD DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES UNDER THE 
NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that Player A, a popular player in the National Football 
League (―NFL‖) is allegedly involved in defrauding several charitable 
organizations of which he is a board member.1  Player A is arrested and 
indicted on various federal criminal charges.  At first, Player A is 
reluctant to provide federal authorities with personal and organizational 
financial documents because he is in complete disbelief of the 
allegations.  Upon compliance with the requests and discussion with 
authorities, it comes to light that Player A‘s fellow board member in the 
charity acted alone in the criminal activity.  However, because Player A 
was initially reluctant to cooperate and may not have been duly diligent 
in running the organization, Player A pleads to an obstruction of justice 
charge.  Player A serves no jail time and agrees to reimburse a major 
portion of the defrauded money. 
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has been monitoring the situation 
and is disappointed that Player A was involved in the allegations, 
especially during a time in which the national economy was 
experiencing a recession.  The public is not aware of the details 
surrounding the plea agreement and Player A‘s actual level of 
involvement in defrauding the charitable organizations.  Consequently, 
the public‘s perception of Player A and the NFL has been negative 
throughout.  Goodell decides to suspend Player A for the remaining six 
games of the season, costing him nearly $1 million in game checks, for 
detrimental conduct that violates the Personal Conduct Policy.2  Goodell 
imposes a severe punishment to prevent further distraction, to show that 
the NFL does not support such criminal conduct, and to send a message 
to other players that they must be in complete control of any charitable 
organizations with which they are involved. 
                                                 
1 This fact pattern is a hypothetical created by the author. 
2 See Personal Conduct Policy, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFL%20Personal
%20Conduct%20Policy%202008.pdf (stating that NFL players must avoid ―conduct 
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football League‖). 
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Player A‘s only hope of reducing the punishment imposed under the 
Policy would be to appeal back to Goodell.3  He could not use the 
independent arbitration process that has been successfully used by 
National Basketball Association (―NBA‖) and Major League Baseball 
(―MLB‖) players because the NFL policy does not allow for a similar 
procedure.4  Further, Player A would not have defined discovery 
guidelines or standards of review for procedural protection.  Thus, if 
Player A appeals to Goodell, his chances of a reduced suspension are 
minimal.5 
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy authorizes the NFL Commissioner 
to ―impose discipline as warranted‖ whenever a player acts in a way that 
does not meet the high standards of NFL players.6  The Commissioner 
can punish a player for conduct that he determines to be merely 
irresponsible even if it is not illegal.7  NFL players are judged at the 
Commissioner‘s discretion and cannot appeal punishments to an 
independent body.8  The Commissioner is the only person authorized to 
review the reasonableness of his decision under the Policy.9  Thus, an 
                                                 
3 See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the appeal process available to players under the 
Personal Conduct Policy). 
4 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (providing examples of how both the NBA and MLB have used 
independent arbitrators). 
5 See, e.g., Associated Press, NFL Upholds Three-game Suspension for Bills RB Lynch, NFL 
(Aug. 3, 2009, 7:39 PM), http://www.nfl.com/trainingcamp/story/09000d5d811 
a221a/article/nfl-upholds-threegame-suspension-for-bills-rb-lynch (explaining that 
Commissioner Goodell upheld the suspension of NFL player Marshawn Lynch for 
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor gun charge); Pacman‘s 1-Year Suspension Upheld, 
ABCNEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id=3832139&page=1 
(discussing Commissioner Goodell‘s decision to uphold the suspension of Adam Jones for 
the accumulation of various instances of detrimental conduct); Jones Drops Appeal of One-
year NFL Suspension, ESPN (June 13, 2007, 2:14 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ 
story?id=2901842 (stating that Adam Jones dropped his appeal to Commissioner Goodell 
and that Commissioner Goodell suspended Tank Johnson and Chris Henry each for eight 
games). 
6 Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2.  ―All persons associated with the NFL are 
required to avoid ‗conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the 
National Football League.‘‖  Id. at 1. 
7 Id. at 1–2.  ―[A]n employee of the NFL or a member club [is] held to a higher standard 
and expected to conduct [himself] in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon 
which the League is based, and is lawful.‖  Id.  Persons who violate any part of this 
standard are still subject to discipline because ―[i]t is not enough simply to avoid being 
found guilty of a crime.‖  Id. 
8 See id. at 3.  All appellate hearings are held ―pursuant to Article XI of the [NFL] 
Collective Bargaining Agreement.‖  Id. 
9 See Commissioner Discipline, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 34, 
available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/NFL%20 
COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2010) (explaining that all appeals will be made to the commissioner and that all 
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NFL player has no way of reversing the Commissioner‘s decision if it is 
excessive or arbitrary.  The NFL Players Association (―NFLPA‖) cannot 
provide any relief because it did not play a role in the Policy‘s 
implementation.10  This problem is unique to professional sports because 
it gives the owners and commissioners power to prevent an employee‘s 
access to an entire industry.11  Furthermore, the agreements between the 
employers and employees are governed not just by contract law but by 
labor laws.12 
The appeal rights of players should be increased in order to limit 
Goodell‘s nearly unchecked authority under the current disciplinary 
structure in the NFL.  When Goodell imposes discipline, the Policy takes 
precedence and vacates other independent appeal rights.13  This ignores 
the successful use of arbitration in the NBA and MLB, federal and state 
policies supporting arbitration, and the proper procedural protections 
recommended by courts and legislatures for appellate review 
processes.14  With the expiration of the NFL Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (―CBA‖) at the end of the 2010 league year, the NFLPA 
should negotiate for an improved Personal Conduct Policy that provides 
players proper appeal rights.15 
The purpose of this Note is to advocate that the Personal Conduct 
Policy should become a part of a new collective bargaining agreement 
and that it should include an independent arbitration process in order to 
preserve players‘ appeal rights when punished for off-field conduct.  
Part II begins with an overview of arbitration and the judicial and 
                                                                                                             
decisions will be complete and final).  The commissioner may choose his own designee to 
review punishments.  Id. 
10 See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the creation of the Personal Conduct Policy). 
11 See infra note 250 and accompanying text (explaining the unique authority of 
commissioners in professional sports). 
12 See infra note 45 (discussing collective bargaining agreements under the rules of labor 
law). 
13 See infra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that when the commissioner imposes discipline, any 
dispute arising from that discipline will be heard by the commissioner alone). 
14 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the grievance procedures utilized in the NBA and 
MLB); infra Part II.A (discussing the development of the use of arbitration through judicial 
and legislative support); infra Part III.D–E (analyzing the need for impartiality, standards of 
review, and reasonably defined procedures in appellate review). 
15 See Goodell‘s Authority to be Part of Talks, ESPN (July 28, 2009, 12:46 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4360661 (discussing the plans to evaluate 
the commissioner‘s authority during negotiations for a new CBA); NFL Owners Opt Out of 
CBA, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80868b78&template=without-
video&confirm=true (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) (explaining that the owners voted 
unanimously to exercise the option to shorten the current agreement by two years and to 
begin negotiations for a new agreement). 
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legislative interpretation of awards.16  It concludes by examining the 
current disciplinary structure in the NFL as well as in the NBA and 
MLB.17  Part III analyzes the NFL commissioner‘s role as a final judge 
under current arbitration laws18 and how unilateral implementation of 
the Policy gives the commissioner such broad authority.19  It also 
examines the ―best interests‖ authority of each league‘s commissioner20 
and compares the standards of review and the appeal procedures used 
in the NFL, NBA, and MLB.21  Part IV proposes that the Policy be 
amended and incorporated into a new NFL collective bargaining 
agreement to limit the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and expand 
players‘ appeal rights.22 
II.  BACKGROUND 
There have been numerous instances of improper off-field conduct 
by NFL players since Roger Goodell was named Commissioner.23  In 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing how the use of arbitration gained support through the 
courts and legislation). 
17 See infra Part II.B (discussing the governing documents of the NFL, NBA, and MLB, as 
well as the disciplinary authority of each league commissioner). 
18 See infra Part III.A (discussing the role of the NFL commissioner in the context of 
arbitration principles). 
19 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the creation of the Personal Conduct Policy as a working 
condition). 
20 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the best interests authority of commissioners in 
professional sports). 
21 See infra Part III.D–E (comparing and analyzing the different procedural protections 
and standards of review used in the appellate procedures in professional sports). 
22 See infra Part IV (explaining how the Personal Conduct Policy should be incorporated 
into the new CBA). 
23 Peter King, Goodell‘s the Guy:  Owners Tab Chief Operating Officer as NFL Commish, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2006, 6:56 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/ 
writers/peter_king/08/08/commish.elected/index.html.  Roger Goodell was elected by 
the owners to succeed Paul Tagliabue as the eighth commissioner of the NFL following 
twenty-four years of working in the League.  Id.; see also Michael Vick Timeline, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 13, 2009, 9:48 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4398110 
(―NFL commissioner Roger Goodell suspends Vick indefinitely without pay from the 
NFL.‖).  Michael Vick pled guilty to federal dog fighting conspiracy charges and was in 
federal custody from November 2007 to July 2009.  Id.; see also Timeline of Trouble for Pacman 
Jones, ESPN (Jan. 8, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=3823894 
(―While Jones awaits formal charges from the Las Vegas incident, commissioner Roger 
Goodell suspends him for the 2007 season, telling him in a written statement:  ‗I must 
emphasize to you that this is your last opportunity to salvage your NFL career.‘‖).  
Following a suspension for the entire 2007 season, Pacman Jones continued to have various 
run-ins with the law that led to yet another suspension for six games in the 2008 season.  
Id.; see also Burress Pleads Guilty on Felony Charge, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2009, 11:55 AM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4411373 (explaining that Plaxico Burress 
was sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty to the attempted criminal 
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response to these events, Goodell has exercised his authority under the 
NFL‘s governing documents and has disciplined players.24  Goodell‘s 
disciplinary decisions have raised concern among players and the 
NFLPA.25  The concerns center on the strict punishments that Goodell 
imposes under the broad disciplinary authority granted to him by a 
Personal Conduct Policy that was implemented without negotiation.26 
Other professional sports leagues use arbitration to resolve disputes 
to remedy some of the concerns analogous to those being voiced in 
regard to Commissioner Goodell‘s recent disciplinary rulings.27  
Currently, the NFL does not allow independent review of rulings under 
                                                                                                             
possession of a weapon).  Goodell suspended Burress for the duration of his incarceration 
and said that he would be able to sign with a team upon completion of his prison term.  Id.; 
see also Judy Battista, Stallworth Suspended for Entire N.F.L. Season, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/sports/football/14stallworth.html (―‗You are 
clearly guilty of conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the N.F.L.,‘ 
Goodell wrote in a letter to Stallworth. ‗Legal arguments that focus on criminal liability 
under Florida law do not diminish that damage or your responsibility for your conduct.‘‖).  
Goodell suspended Donté Stallworth for the 2009 season after Stallworth pled guilty to 
DUI manslaughter following an incident in which he, while driving drunk, struck and 
killed a pedestrian.  Id. 
24 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the governing documents of the NFL, which include 
the Personal Conduct Policy, the CBA, the NFL Constitution and By-laws, and the Uniform 
Player Contract). 
25 Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15; see also Dan Le Batard, NFL Commissioner Roger 
Goodell‘s Methods Not Working, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 2009, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/sports/columnists/dan-le-batard/story/1198456.html (on 
file with author) (suggesting that the disciplinary actions taken by Commissioner Goodell 
have not worked to reduce detrimental behavior by players). 
26 See Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15 (explaining that Goodell‘s disciplinary decisions 
since taking over as commissioner have caused the NFLPA and its new leader, DeMaurice 
Smith, as well as the players, to question the breadth of the commissioner‘s authority to 
discipline players); see also Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-new-conduct-
policy_N.htm (explaining that under the new conduct policy, players as well as teams that 
violate the policy will receive longer suspensions and larger fines); infra Part III.B 
(discussing the lack of negotiation prior to the implementation of the Policy as a working 
condition). 
27 See, e.g., 2007–2011 Basic Agreement, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 
38–39, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last visited Sept. 
24, 2009) [hereinafter MLB Basic Agreement] (stating that a grievance filed in response to a 
disciplinary decision could ultimately end up in arbitration); see also Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n 
v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD), 2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 
2005) (affirming a grievance arbitrator‘s reduction of a suspension determined by the 
commissioner); In re Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors 
Basketball Club & Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) (Feerick, 
Arb.) (holding that because the commissioner‘s suspension of player Latrell Sprewell was 
not in the interest of fairness and justice, the arbitrator was correct in reducing it). 
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the Personal Conduct Policy.28  With the expiration of the NFL CBA at 
the end of the 2010 season, NFLPA leader DeMaurice Smith will have 
the opportunity to negotiate for impartial arbitration akin to what the 
NBA and MLB allow.29 
Part II.A of this Note will explore increased legislative and judicial 
support for the use of arbitration.30  It will also present the grounds for 
vacating or modifying an arbitration award.31  Part II.B will examine the 
current governing documents that form the disciplinary structure in 
professional sports leagues beginning with the NFL and concluding with 
the NBA and MLB.32 
A. The Development of Arbitration 
Arbitration is used in place of litigation as an alternative method of 
dispute resolution.33  Generally, two parties use it as the final step in a 
grievance procedure that is often through a collective bargaining 
agreement.34  Though there are several methods of arbitration, for the 
                                                 
28 See infra Part II.B.1.d (explaining the appeals process for disciplinary decisions under 
the Policy). 
29 Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15; see NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 15 
(stating that the current agreement has been shortened and will expire at the end of the 
2010 season). 
30 See infra Part II.A (discussing arbitration and its application in labor situations). 
31 See infra Part II.A.3 (stating the statutory and common law grounds for invalidating an 
arbitration award). 
32 See infra Part II.B (discussing the discipline in the governing documents of the NFL, 
NBA, and MLB). 
33 Collective Bargaining, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
collective_bargaining (last visited Aug. 15, 2010); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (stating that in contracting to arbitrate a claim, the parties are 
agreeing to forgo the use of a judicial forum to resolve the issue); Mark Berger, Arbitration 
and Arbitrability:  Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 756 (2004) [hereinafter 
Berger, Arbitrability] (explaining that the Supreme Court has made it clear that arbitration is 
―simply the substitution of one decision making forum for another.‖); see also United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (explaining that 
arbitration is a substitute for litigation in commercial disputes, but in labor disputes, 
arbitration is a substitute for labor strife). 
34 Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
L. REV. 197, 197 (1989).  ―Over ninety percent of American collective bargaining agreements 
provide for some form of grievance procedure, ending in arbitration, to resolve all disputes 
over the application or interpretation of the agreement.‖  Id.  Submission of a dispute to a 
mutually agreed upon third party arbitrator comes after the parties first make an attempt 
to settle the dispute through negotiation between unions and management.  Id.  The 
grievance process is a three to four step process that begins when an employee notifies a 
supervisor of a grievance soon after it has occurred.  Id. at 202.  As negotiations for a 
settlement remain at an impasse, the grievance moves up the levels of management.  Id.  
Once the steps have been exhausted with no settlement, the grievance is submitted to an 
arbitrator.  Id. at 202–03; see also Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Gen. 
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purposes of this Note, the term ―arbitration‖ will refer to grievance 
arbitration.35  Grievance arbitration refers to the use of an independent 
arbitrator to resolve the contractual language issues in a labor dispute 
between two parties.36  The use of this form of arbitration started with 
the implementation of various pieces of legislation.37  As arbitration grew 
in popularity, courts began to examine the issues of when and for what 
purposes arbitration may be used.38  Finally, following the establishment 
of a policy supporting arbitration, grounds for vacating awards were 
carved out.39 
                                                                                                             
Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an arbitration agreement is 
generally included in a collective bargaining agreement as the final step in the grievance 
process); Tracy Lipinski, Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Garvey Narrows the Judicial 
Strike Zone of Arbitration Awards, 36 AKRON L. REV. 325, 328–29 (2003) (discussing how 
employers and unions that collectively bargain generally have a defined process for 
deciding matters which arise under the labor agreement).  The objective of arbitration is to 
efficiently settle disputes while preventing lengthy, expensive litigation. Id. at 329; see also 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578–80 (discussing the importance of collective 
bargaining agreements between employers and unions, particularly as establishing a 
system of self-government); Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC 
L. REV. 693, 698–700 (1993) (discussing the structure of an arbitration process included in an 
agreement between an employer and a union); infra Part II.B (discussing the arbitration 
process in the NFL, NBA, and MLB). 
35 See, e.g., ROBERT V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., HISTORY OF 
ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, available at 
http://www.wvu.edu/~exten/depts/ilsr/arbitration_history.pdf (explaining that 
disputes between other countries are settled through international arbitration, a method of 
preventing war and promoting world peace).  Commercial arbitration is used to resolve 
disputes between American companies and international companies.  Id.  Interest 
arbitration is the arbitration over terms to be included in a contract that takes place when 
there is an impasse in negotiations.  Id.  In professional sports, it is analogous to salary 
arbitration.  Id. 
36 Id.; see also Zelek, supra note 34, at 198 (―The major advantage of grievance 
arbitration . . . is that it enables labor and management to settle their differences while the 
contract is in effect without strikes or lockouts.‖).  The role of an independent arbitrator is 
usually filled by a lawyer but can be filled by non-lawyers such as college professors with 
expertise in economics or political science.  Id. at 203.  The selection of an arbitrator can be 
made part of the initial agreement between two parties, or an arbitrator can be chosen from 
a list of arbitrators by order of preference for each dispute that makes it to arbitration.  Id. 
37 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the enactment of arbitration legislation). 
38 See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the various court holdings that define the use of 
grievance arbitration). 
39 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing statutory and judicial grounds for vacation of 
arbitration awards). 
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1. Arbitration and Legislation 
Arbitration did not become popular in the United States until the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.40  Initially, courts were 
reluctant to give significant weight to private arbitration awards.41  
However, federal and state legislatures adopted measures to increase the 
legal enforcement of arbitration agreements.42  Congress enacted the 
Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖), which made commercial arbitration 
agreements ―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.‖43  The FAA also 
                                                 
40 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (Marlin M. 
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (discussing the use of arbitration throughout 
the history of the world).  King Solomon used an arbitration procedure similar to that 
which is used today.  Id.  Phillip II included arbitration in treaties as a method to resolve 
disputes over territories.  Id.  Commercial disputes in the Middle Ages and between Native 
American tribes were settled by arbitration.  Id.; see also MASSEY, supra note 35, at 23 
(discussing the growth of grievance arbitration clauses from the late 19th century and on).  
The United Mine Workers Association incorporated a grievance arbitration clause into its 
constitution at its founding convention in 1890.  MASSEY supra note 35, at 2.  Grievance 
arbitration in labor disputes became the popular process of alternative dispute resolution 
around the time of World War II as a method to avoid work stoppages affecting the 
production of war materials.  Id. at 3.  By 1944, 73% of American labor contracts contained 
an arbitration clause.  Id.  That number rose to 95% in the 1980‘s and has continued to rise 
to 98% today.  Id. 
41 Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 754.  ―Private arbitration was viewed as usurping 
the jurisdiction of the legal system, and therefore courts permitted the parties to refuse to 
abide by their prior agreement to arbitrate without fear of any significant legal sanction.‖  
Id.; see also Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (discussing a line of cases that held 
arbitration agreements illegal if they attempted to supersede the jurisdiction of the courts); 
Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873) (discouraging the elimination of the courts 
of jurisdiction by an arbitration agreement). 
42 Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 755 n.7.  New York supported the legal 
enforcement of arbitration agreements when it enacted an arbitration statute in 1920.  1920 
N.Y. Laws 275.2, codified at N.Y. ARBITRATION LAW §§ 7501–14 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 
2010); see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701–5725 (Supp. 2008) (enacting the Uniform 
Arbitration Act [―UAA‖] in the state of Delaware); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1–23 (2007 
& Supp. 2010) (enacting the UAA in Illinois); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1–19 (2004 
& Supp. 2010) (enacting the UAA in Massachusetts). 
43 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–77 
(1995) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act was validly established by Congress under 
its Commerce Clause power and that any transaction involving interstate commerce 
between two parties who have reached an arbitration agreement is within the scope of the 
FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (holding that the FAA‘s creation 
under Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority makes it enforceable in both federal and 
state courts); Lipinski, supra note 34, at 330–31 (discussing Congress‘s enactment of the 
FAA and other arbitration legislation).  A segment of labor arbitration, however, does not 
seem to be within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act based upon statutory language, 
which states that ―nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.‖  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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provided for a stay of litigation in cases involving arbitrable issues and a 
court order that would compel arbitration of the dispute as well as 
discovery of material evidence.44  Despite congressional intent to reduce 
the courts‘ hostility towards commercial arbitration agreements, parties 
to labor agreements did not find the same relief in the FAA.45 
Labor disputes between employers and unions that have collectively 
bargained arbitration agreements are governed by section 301(a) of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act.46  With the creation of the Act, 
Congress expressed its preference for arbitration rather than strikes or 
litigation as a method to resolve labor disputes.47  The Supreme Court 
held in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama that 
section 301 of the Act allows a party to sue in federal court to compel the 
                                                 
44 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 7.  If a court is satisfied that a matter is arbitrable under the agreement 
at issue, it will stay the action until the arbitration process has been completed.  Id. § 3.  A 
party that alleges a failure to arbitrate a dispute in the face of a written agreement to 
arbitrate may petition a United States district court to hand down an order to follow the 
arbitration procedure.  Id.  The arbitrator has the authority to summon any person as a 
witness and to bring any material piece of evidence before the hearing.  Id. § 7; see also In re 
Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that an arbitrator has 
the power to order the production of documents by any party prior to a hearing because it 
promotes the policy of efficiency).  But see Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd‘s 
of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator does not have the 
authority to order discovery from non-parties). 
45 See Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers, 911 F. Supp. 1116, 1123 (N.D. Ind. 1995) 
(applying the FAA to commercial arbitration awards in areas of interstate commerce and 
admiralty but not to labor arbitration awards); Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of 
Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review or Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 337, 339 (2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO 68-96, at 1 (1924)) (explaining Congress‘s 
intention to reverse past animosity towards arbitration agreements and to make them as 
enforceable as other contracts).  Arbitration in the context of commercial disputes is 
different from that of a labor dispute because each provides different functions.  United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).  In labor disputes, 
arbitration is closely linked to CBAs that are a more encompassing code of governance than 
contracts that serve as the basis of commercial disputes.  Id.; see also Ludwig Honold Mfg. 
Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1969) (explaining that the FAA can be used as 
guidance in judicial review of labor agreements); Textile Workers Union v. Am. Thread 
Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953) (explaining that federal courts should use the 
FAA as a guide in enforcing labor arbitration agreements). 
46 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). Section 301(a) of the Act provides that ―[s]uits for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . or 
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties.‖  Id.; see Am. Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. at 142 
(concluding that § 301 gives federal courts specific authority to enforce arbitration 
agreements in labor contracts).  See generally Lipinski, supra note 34, at 327 n.10 (discussing 
Congress‘s enactment of § 301 of the LMRA). 
47 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).  Section 203(d) of the Act provides that the final method agreed 
upon by the parties is the method for settling grievances over the interpretation of a 
collective bargaining agreement.  Id. 
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other party to either submit to arbitration of a dispute as previously 
agreed or to comply with an arbitrator‘s award.48 
A CBA used in professional sports leagues that contains arbitration 
agreements is subject to the rules of the National Labor Relations Act 
(―NLRA‖).49  Under this Act, employers and the labor union 
representing the employees must collectively bargain all conditions of 
employment.50  Courts have held that an organization must also use 
collective bargaining to establish a grievance settlement procedure.51  
NFL provisions not created through arms-length bargaining may be 
improper and not part of the agreement.52 
                                                 
48 353 U.S. 448, 458–59 (1957); see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 
83–86 (2002) (discussing the types of gateway procedural questions that are subject to 
judicial resolution as opposed to arbitration); First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944–45 (1995) (discussing the court‘s role in determining if there was an agreement to 
arbitrate an issue); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556–58 (1964) 
(holding that procedural issues are questions to be resolved through the arbitration process 
because adjudication by courts could entangle it with substantive issues subject only to 
arbitration). 
49 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (holding that 
Major League Baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 
306 U.S. 601, 606–08 (1939) (explaining that industries involved in or affecting interstate 
commerce are subject to the NLRA); Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass‘n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff‘d on other grounds, 532 
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the MLB CBA is subject to the same laws as a CBA 
in another industry). 
50 29 U.S.C. § 157.  Labor unions are given their authority under section 7 of the NLRA, 
which states that employees have the right to organize themselves into labor organizations 
and collectively bargain through self-chosen representatives.  Id.  Employees designate 
representatives that shall collectively bargain for ―rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment.‖  Id. § 159(a). 
51 See NLRB v. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979) (explaining that 
grievance-arbitration procedures are terms of employment and mandatory subjects of 
bargaining under the NLRA). 
52 See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) (presenting 
an example of a rule that was improper because bargaining did not take place in its 
implementation).  The NFL‘s implementation of the Rozelle Rule restricting player 
movement was not the result of ―bona fide arm‘s-length bargaining‖ but instead the 
unilateral creation by the teams.  Id.  The Rule was not a quid pro quo for other benefits to 
the players and was outside the scope of the CBA.  Id.; see, e.g., Nat‘l Football League 
Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a rule that would fine 
players $200 for leaving the bench area during a fight was unilaterally implemented by the 
owners and was therefore improper).  The commissioner must consult with both parties in 
the promulgation of a rule.  Id.  See generally PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS:  
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 71–72 (1996) (explaining that the Rozelle Rule 
allowed the commissioner to force a team that signed a free agent to compensate the team 
to which the free agent previously belonged). 
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2. Arbitration in the Court System 
The Court further established governing principles for judicial 
review of arbitration agreements and awards in a group of cases known 
as the ―Steelworkers Trilogy.‖53  First, when a party attempts to compel 
another party to arbitrate, a court will presume that the dispute is 
arbitrable.54  To rule otherwise, a court would need to have nearly 
definitive evidence that it was not within the intentions of the parties to 
arbitrate that dispute.55  Therefore, if an arbitration agreement is 
particularly broad, the chance of a dispute escaping arbitration is 
minimal.56 
The second principle gained from the Trilogy is that judicial review 
of an arbitrator‘s award is very limited.57  The scope of review does not 
extend to the merits of the award or the principles of interpretation that 
the arbitrator applied to the agreement.58  Instead, a court may review an 
arbitration award in reference to various statutory or judicial grounds for 
                                                 
53 See generally United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) 
(limiting the judicial review of an arbitrator‘s reward); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (discussing how a court should determine whether 
parties intended to arbitrate a dispute); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 
(1960) (explaining when there is a presumption that a dispute is arbitrable). 
54 See Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567–68 (explaining that lower courts are never to decide 
the merits of, or whether there is equity in, a grievance that is filed if there is an agreement 
between the two parties to submit all grievances to arbitration).  This includes any 
grievance that seems frivolous on its face.  Id. at 568.  Deciding the merits ―under the guise 
of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements . . . usurps a 
function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.‖  Id. at 569. 
55 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.  The Court held that ―[a]n order to 
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.‖  Id. at 582–83; see also 
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 769–70 (explaining that there should be a presumption 
of arbitrability). 
56 Zelek, supra note 34, at 200–01.  By establishing this rule, the Court made it very 
difficult for parties to an arbitration agreement to utilize the courts.  Id.; see, e.g. Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (discussing the 
presumption that in commercial contract disputes the controlling intentions of the parties 
are generously construed towards arbitrability); Moses H. Cone Mem‘l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (explaining that in non-labor cases brought under the 
FAA, questions as to arbitrability ―should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the 
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability‖). 
57 See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (stating that an arbitrator‘s award is 
legitimate if it ―draws its essence‖ from the contract between the two parties). 
58 See id. at 596 (―The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the 
proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.‖); Zelek, supra note 
34, at 201 (explaining that an arbitrator‘s informed judgment will be used in interpreting 
and applying the terms of a CBA to a grievance). 
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vacation or modification.59  Furthermore, this rule reflects the policy that 
the parties to an arbitration agreement bargained for an arbitrator‘s 
interpretation of the agreement.60 
Furthering these principles, the Court stated in United Paperworkers 
International Union v. Misco, Inc. that so long as an arbitrator acts within 
his or her authority to properly interpret or apply the agreement, a court 
cannot overturn that decision even if the arbitrator bases his decision on 
mistakes of fact or law.61  The Court emphasized that arbitration, 
grievance procedures, and the responsibilities of the arbitrator are 
essential to the collective bargaining process and courts can only 
invalidate the decisions on certain grounds.62 
3. Vacating or Modifying Arbitration Awards 
Although courts generally give great deference to arbitration 
awards, courts may vacate the decision of an arbitrator in some 
circumstances.63  In labor disputes, courts have stated that an arbitration 
                                                 
59 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the grounds for invalidating an arbitration award); see 
also Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596 (explaining that giving courts expansive 
judicial review, including final authority on the merits of the arbitration awards, would 
undercut the federal policy of making arbitration the primary method of resolution in labor 
disputes).  If the merits of every arbitration award were reviewable by a court, the 
provisions of an arbitration agreement pertaining to finality would be meaningless.  Enter. 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599. 
60 Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.  Because the parties bargained for the 
arbitrator‘s interpretation and construction of the collective bargaining agreement, a court 
has no standing to overrule the arbitrator based on a different opinion of interpretation.  
Id.; see Zelek, supra note 34, at 201 (explaining that if a party to an agreement disagrees with 
the contracted-for arbitrator‘s interpretation of the agreement, that party may renegotiate 
the terms of the agreement or the arbitrator used). 
61 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987).  A court should not reject the factual findings or the 
interpretation of the contract by an arbitrator.  Id.  The Court stated the following in 
regards to judicial review of mistakes of law or fact: 
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an 
arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator‘s 
view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have 
agreed to accept.  Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or 
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing 
decisions of lower courts. 
Id.; see also Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509–10 (2001) 
(discussing that the limited role of the courts does not include evaluating the merits of the 
grievance); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 
(2000) (explaining that if a court decides that an arbitrator has acted within his scope of 
authority, that court should treat the arbitrator‘s decisions as representative of the 
agreement between the two parties regarding the dispute). 
62 United Paperworkers Int‘l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
63 See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599 (holding that a court cannot overrule an 
arbitrator based on a difference of opinion because the parties bargained for the 
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award can be overturned if an arbitrator goes outside the terms of the 
agreement and ―dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice.‖64  This 
does not include declining to follow the precedent of previous decisions 
because arbitrators are not bound by the decisions of previous 
arbitrators.65  In some cases, however, courts have overturned arbitration 
agreements for egregious error of law.66 
A lack of reasonable procedural protection can also lead to the 
vacation of disciplinary decisions.67  Reasonable procedures include 
sufficient advance notice of a claim, the opportunity for a hearing, and 
the orderly presentation of evidence.68  If procedures are insufficient, a 
sanction may be per se illegal because it is inherently defective.69  
Arbitration agreements are also affected if there is not a definitive 
                                                                                                             
interpretation of the arbitrator); Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 764 (stating that the 
current state of arbitration law includes a ―highly deferential standard of review‖); 
Lipinski, supra note 34, at 334–39 (discussing both statutory and common law grounds for 
overturning arbitration awards). 
64 Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (―[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation 
and application of the collective bargaining agreement . . . .‖); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Local 759, Int‘l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 766–67 (1983) (discussing when a 
violation of public policy is great enough to overturn an arbitration award).  Labor 
arbitration awards can also be vacated for narrow public policy reasons.  Id.; see also Harry 
T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards:  The Clash Between the Public Policy 
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1988) (explaining that a broad 
public policy exception overturning arbitration awards is improper because it ignores the 
public policies in favor of arbitration). 
65 Int‘l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2002).  Most circuits have held 
that labor arbitrators are only bound by previous arbitrators‘ decisions if the CBA 
stipulates the creation of such a common law.  Id. 
66 Misco, 484 U.S. at 37–38; see also LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitration award could be overturned for manifest 
disregard of the law); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse:  Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 89–98 (1997) (discussing the standard of 
―Manifest Disregard of the Law‖). 
67 See John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports:  The Antitrust Issues, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 710–13 (1977) (discussing the use of reasonableness as a standard 
of review for disciplinary decisions).  Notions of procedural protection are similar to 
constitutional due process requirements.  Id. at 713.  However, those requirements ―must 
be tempered by the peculiar nature of . . . private decision-making.‖  Id.; see also, e.g., Bridge 
Corp. of Am. v. Am. Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(discussing the use of an unreasonableness rule to evaluate agreements and practices in 
labor self-regulation). 
68 See Weistart, supra note 67, at 712, 715 (explaining what defines procedural fairness). 
69 See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Prof‘l Golf Ass‘n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265–66 (N.D. Ga. 1973) 
(holding that the procedures in place were insufficient and so the sanction handed down to 
the female golfer was per se illegal and a violation of antitrust laws).  The suspension was 
imposed without a proper hearing.  Id. at 1265. 
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standard of review on which an arbitrator can base his decision.70  
Moreover, if the sanction is banishment instead of a fine, an examination 
of the procedural protections is even more important.71 
The Supreme Court has stated that improper procedural aspects of 
discipline can also bring about antitrust violations.72  Procedural 
protections ensure proper notice and a hearing, which allow for the 
administration of antitrust laws.73  Reasonable procedures encourage 
compliance with substantive antitrust statutes and discourage arbitrary 
disciplinary action by the commissioner.74 
Courts can overturn or modify commercial agreement awards on 
statutory grounds under the FAA.75  Courts allow modifications of 
commercial arbitration awards in cases of miscalculations of awards for 
a matter not submitted to the arbitrator.76  Viable grounds for vacation 
include an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers as well as improper 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clymer, No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. July 1, 1993) (holding that when an insurance contract is ambiguous as to the 
proper standard to apply, the contract will be construed against the insurer).  The contract 
was ambiguous because it referred to two different standards of review.  Id. at *2. 
71 See Weistart, supra note 67, at 714 (explaining that the need for a careful procedural 
structure increases with the severity of the punishment).  The degree of procedural 
protections required will vary with the severity of the consequences and the sophistication 
of the fact situation.  Id. at 714; cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 
(1950) (discussing the idea that in a case where the deprivation of fundamental rights and 
liberties are at stake, the procedural protection provided should be ―appropriate to the 
nature of the case‖). 
72 See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364–65 (1963) (explaining that by not 
providing the proper procedural safeguards, a private organization exceeds its authority to 
self-regulate under antitrust laws).  Antitrust laws were not created by Congress to protect 
fundamentally unfair self-regulation.  Id. at 364. 
73 Id. at 362–63; see also Weistart, supra note 67, at 710–13 (discussing the applicability of 
procedural safeguards to the adjudication of antitrust laws).  Procedures ―serve to define 
more precisely the factual basis for the group‘s actions as well as the defenses and 
contentions of the accused‖ and allow a court to better determine ―whether a basis exists 
for the discipline and whether the action is justified.‖  Weistart, supra note 67, at 711. 
74 Silver, 373 U.S. at 362.  While anti-trust issues are not a pertinent aspect of the 
discussion or analysis in this Note, they are nevertheless a major part of the legal 
discussion regarding professional sports leagues.  See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner 
Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts?  Analyzing Whether the NFL 
Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631 (2009) (discussing 
the anti-trust implications of the Personal Conduct Policy); Weistart, supra note 67, at 703 
(explaining the anti-trust issues that arise as consequences of the structure and operation of 
professional sports leagues). 
75 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006).  Section 10 allows for the vacation of an award or a rehearing 
by the arbitrators.  Id. § 10.  Section 11 provides for an order to modify or correct an 
arbitration decision.  Id. § 11; see also Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers, 911 F. Supp. 
1116, 1123 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (explaining that the FAA applies to commercial arbitration 
awards in areas of interstate commerce and admiralty but not to labor arbitration awards). 
76 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)–(b). 
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behavior by the arbitrator such as fraud or corruption.77  Evident 
partiality by the arbitrator is also prohibited.78  Courts evaluate evidence 
of partiality or bias on the basis of whether a reasonable person would 
conclude that an arbitrator is partial after reviewing all of the 
circumstances.79  A material relationship existing between the arbitrator 
and a party meets this standard.80  Courts have held that there is evident 
                                                 
77 Id. § 10(a)(1)–(4). 
78 See id. § 10(a)(2) (stating that a court may vacate an arbitrator‘s award if it is shown 
that the arbitrator was not impartial); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Counsel 
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the standard for 
evident partiality that would violate the FAA is whether a reasonable person, after 
analyzing all of the circumstances, must conclude that the arbitrator is biased); Joel 
Fischman & Dirk D. Potter, Pinch-Hitting for Baseball‘s Present System—Impartial Arbitration 
as a Method of Dispute Resolution, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 704 (1981) (discussing how the 
commissioner of Major League Baseball is ―naturally partial towards management‖ 
because he is in fact appointed by the owners); Weistart, supra note 67, at 715–17 
(evaluating the presence of prejudice and bias in disciplinary decisions in professional 
sports); see also Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 178 
(1995) (discussing the importance of a neutral arbitrator in disputes over discipline of 
serious off-field misconduct).  But see Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary 
Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners:  A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by 
the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1417–20 (1990) (explaining that often 
arbitrators are chosen for special expertise in an area, the type of expertise a commissioner 
utilizes as the final authority); Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please:  Commissioner 
―Best Interests‖ Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1706 
(1999) (recognizing that it is difficult for a third party arbitrator to avoid imposing her 
views on a ruling). 
79 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84.  Requiring the mere appearance of bias is too low 
of a standard whereas requiring actual proof of bias is too high of a standard.  Id.; see also 
Labor Arbitration Rules, AM. ARBITRATION ASS‘N §§ 5, 11, 17, http://www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=32599 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010) (stating that arbitrators must be neutral).  An 
arbitrator can be removed if he or she has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of 
the dispute.  Labor Arbitration Rules, supra, § 17.  See generally Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer 
Hope, Disclosure and Disqualification Standards for Neutral Arbitrators:  How Far to Cast the 
Net and What is Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 203, 203–09 (2007) 
(discussing the requirement of impartiality and how courts have defined evident 
partiality). 
80 See, e.g., Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 
F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that there was evident partiality when an arbitrator‘s 
employing corporation had done more than $275,000 in business with the corporation of 
one of the involved parties); see also Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Cont‘l Cas. Co., 393 
U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (holding that a business relationship between the arbitrator and one of 
the parties was significant despite a minimal transfer of payments).  An arbitrator ―must be 
unbiased . . . [and] also must avoid even the appearance of bias.‖  Id. at 150; see also The 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AM. BAR ASS‘N, 3–6 (Feb. 9, 2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf (stating that impartiality is 
required to uphold the process and that an arbitrator must disclose any partial 
relationships).  An arbitrator must disclose ―[a]ny known existing or past financial, 
business, professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality 
or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.‖  The Code of Ethics, supra, at 5. 
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partiality when the arbitrator‘s company was in business negotiations 
with one of the parties.81  Being a part of the management team of a party 
may also evidence a material relationship.82 
These grounds for vacation protect against lack of impartiality and 
procedural safeguards, the same dangers that have drawn concern in the 
NFL system.83  The dangers stem from a disciplinary structure made up 
of several governing documents that grant the NFL Commissioner broad 
authority to impose punishment on NFL players.84  Within the 
disciplinary structure of professional sports, the use of a Personal 
Conduct Policy with no independent appeal process distinguishes 
procedures of the NFL from those of the NBA and MLB.85 
B. Disciplinary Structure in Professional Sports 
Executive leadership in professional sports leagues, as in any other 
industry, has the power to discipline employees; however, the leagues 
organize the disciplinary structure in a way that is unique to professional 
sports.86  Unlike other industries, professional sports leagues subject 
player-employees to discipline by both league officials and teams.87  In 
general, the league commissioner holds the most powerful disciplinary 
authority in terms of scope and enforcement.88  The commissioner can 
                                                 
81 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139. 
82 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 16 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(explaining that although the NFL commissioner must act impartially, he may be 
considered an agent of management preventing impartiality).  But see Nat‘l Football League 
Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 968 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by 
Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that although the 
presiding designee provided legal advice to one of the parties prior to the hearing, the 
foreseeable partiality had been accepted by the NFLPA when it agreed to the terms of the 
NFL CBA). 
83 See infra Part III.A (discussing the commissioner‘s role as an arbitrator of disputes 
under FAA standards). 
84 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the disciplinary structure of the NFL). 
85 See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the Personal Conduct Policy and commissioner 
authority). 
86 See Molinas v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) 
(discussing the importance of rules and regulations to a league‘s survival).  In Molinas, the 
plaintiff was suspended for violating a league rule prohibiting gambling.  Id. at 242.  The 
court held that ―[e]very league . . . must have some reasonable governing rules, and these 
rules must necessarily include disciplinary provisions.‖  Id. at 243–44; see also Weistart, 
supra note 67, at 703 (explaining the unique relationship between players, clubs, and 
commissioners with regards to discipline in professional sports). 
87 See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 167–68 (analogizing the disciplinary structure in 
professional sports to that in a traditional employment setting). 
88 See Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (explaining that 
the authority given to the commissioner is as expansive as the language of the agreement 
through which the office was created); RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND 
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discipline players, coaches, and other league employees for misconduct 
through fines, suspensions, or banishment.89  Within the NFL, this 
authority to discipline granted to its commissioner is shaped by several 
overlapping governing documents.90 
1. Governing Documents of the National Football League 
Four documents form the disciplinary structure of the NFL:  the 
Constitution and Bylaws, the Player Contract (―the Contract‖), the CBA, 
and the Personal Conduct Policy.91  Each document shapes the authority 
of and methods available to the commissioner for disciplining a player.92  
The documents prescribe how an appeal of disciplinary action is heard.93  
The following subsection will discuss the governing documents, the 
authority each grants, and the appeals processes involving either the 
commissioner or a grievance procedure culminating with arbitration. 
a. Disciplinary Authorities 
The NFL governing documents allow both teams and the 
commissioner to discipline players by vesting them with the authority to 
terminate a player‘s contract for improper conduct.94  Article VIII of the 
                                                                                                             
MATERIALS 379–80 (2006) (describing the commissioner‘s dominant authority over league 
matters); infra Part III.C (discussing the best interests authority given to commissioners). 
89 Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, NAT‘L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 28, 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2010) [hereinafter NFL Constitution]; Major League Constitution, THE BIZ OF 
BASEBALL, 2, http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2010); NAT‘L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOC‘N, NBPA COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, A-14 to A-15 [hereinafter Misconduct], available at 
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
90 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the role of each governing document in determining 
the scope of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority). 
91 See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing which of the NFL‘s governing 
documents takes precedence over the others in certain situations); see also Stiglitz, supra 
note 78, at 171–72 (providing a general discussion of the overlap of rules in professional 
sports). 
92 See infra Part II.B.1.a (explaining how each governing document authorizes the 
commissioner to discipline); infra Part II.B.1.b (explaining the sections of each document 
that involve disciplinary authority and procedures). 
93 See infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing the methods of appeal before the commissioner and 
the grievance process). 
94 NFL Player Contract, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 248, 
available at http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING% 
20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).  Paragraph 11 of the 
contract gives the Club the power to terminate the contract for conduct that is ―reasonably 
judged by [the] Club to adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club.‖  Id. at 252.  Paragraph 15 
of the contract provides the Commissioner with the same authority.  Id. at 253. 
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NFL CBA specifically discusses ―Club Discipline,‖ giving each team 
disciplinary authority over its players.95  It lists numerous infractions, 
along with corresponding sanctions, for which a team may punish a 
player.96  Article VIII also gives clubs authority to discipline a player for 
additional infractions of conduct detrimental to the club.97 
Article XI of the NFL CBA and section 8.3 of the Constitution give 
the commissioner power to discipline players as well as the ultimate 
authority to resolve disputes stemming from that discipline.98  This 
authority extends to situations involving coaches, owners, and NFL 
employees.99  If the club and the commissioner discipline a player for the 
same conduct, the commissioner‘s expansive scope of authority results in 
his decision taking precedence.100 
b. Scope of the Authority 
The standard NFL Player Contract defines the scope of player 
conduct and discipline.101  Upon signing a contract with any team, the 
player agrees to maintain proper conduct and recognizes that ―the 
                                                 
95 Club Discipline, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 19, available at 
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
96 Id. at 19–20.  Article VIII provides a maximum discipline schedule for conduct 
including weight violations, damaging equipment, ejection from a game, losing a 
playbook, and tardiness.  Id. 
97 Id.  The maximum penalty under the detrimental conduct clause is set at a fine equal 
to one week‘s salary and/or a suspension without pay for no more than four weeks.  Id. at 
19; see also Chiefs Give Two-Week Suspension to RB Johnson, Who Plans Appeal, NFL (Oct. 28, 
2009), http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d813c7eaa&template=with-video-
with-comments&confirm=true (discussing the Kansas City Chiefs‘ suspension of Larry 
Johnson for two weeks for using a gay slur).  If Johnson planned to appeal the punishment, 
the appeal could go to an independent arbitrator because it was team discipline and would 
therefore fall under Article IX of the NFL CBA for a Non-Injury Grievance.  Club Discipline, 
supra note 95, at 20. 
98 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34.  The procedures for disputes arising from 
the commissioner‘s disciplinary power are ―[n]otwithstanding anything stated in Article IX 
(Non-Injury Grievance).‖  Id. 
99 NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28.  The commissioner has authority to oversee a 
dispute certified to him between two or more members of the NFL.  Id.  The commissioner 
may preside over a dispute between a player or coach and any team.  Id.  This includes 
disputes among players, coaches, or teams as well as those between players and league 
officials on and off the field.  Id. 
100 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35.  ―The Commissioner and a Club will not 
discipline a player for the same act or conduct.  The Commissioner‘s disciplinary action 
will preclude or supersede disciplinary action by any Club for the same act or conduct.‖  
Id.; see also Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 20 (explaining that discipline imposed by the 
commissioner supersedes team discipline when it is for the same action). 
101 NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 252–53.  This includes either on-field or off-field 
conduct.  Id. at 248. 
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success of professional football depends largely on public respect for and 
approval of those associated with the game.‖102  The Contract explains 
that a team or the commissioner can discipline players for conduct that 
reflects poorly on the character and integrity of the game or the player 
and diminishes public confidence.103  The Constitution also grants the 
commissioner authority to discipline any player who commits such 
conduct.104  As the ultimate arbiter, the commissioner uses his judgment 
to define conduct that is detrimental to the best interests of the NFL.105 
The commissioner may fine, suspend, or terminate a player‘s 
contract when he determines that a player‘s conduct was harmful to the 
NFL.106  While there are set fine amounts and punishments listed in the 
Constitution, section 8.13(B) allows the commissioner to recommend an 
increased punishment when he deems necessary.107  The commissioner‘s 
decision is final and unappealable if the owners and an executive 
committee accept that recommendation.108 
                                                 
102 Id. at 248.  The player ―agrees to give his best efforts and loyalty to the Club‖ for the 
public approval of the game.  Id.  The contract is between the player and team and is valid 
for the specified term.  Id. 
103 Id. at 252–53.  A team may terminate a player‘s contract for personal conduct that 
adversely reflects on the team.  Id. at 252.  The contract recognizes the value of the integrity 
of the game and focuses on conduct involved with gambling activity, drugs and substance 
abuse, and any other detrimental conduct.  Id. at 253. 
104 NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29–35.  Gambling and conduct harmful to the 
League‘s best interests is discussed specifically in the Constitution as grounds for 
disciplinary action.  Id. at 34–35.  If a player is found to have bet on any games in the 
League or failed to report knowledge of a betting scheme, the Commissioner has the 
authority to discipline that player in various ways including banishment.  Id. at 34. 
105 Id. at 35.  The Commissioner‘s arbitration authority includes ―[a]ny dispute 
involving . . . members in the League or any players or employees of the members of the 
League . . . that in the opinion of the Commissioner constitutes conduct detrimental to the 
best interests of the League.‖  Id. at 28; see also Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off-
Court Misbehavior:  Sports Leagues and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 
576 (2009) (explaining that the league commissioner has ―indeterminate discretion‖ to 
define conduct that is detrimental to the best interests of the league). 
106 NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 253.  The player has the opportunity for a 
hearing with representation in front of the commissioner before the disciplinary decision 
takes effect.  Id.; see also supra note 23 (providing several examples of Goodell‘s disciplinary 
decisions in response to instances of detrimental conduct). 
107 NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31–34; see also Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but 
Avoids Suspension, ESPN (Sept. 14, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id= 
3018338 (stating that the NFL fined Bill Belichick $500,000 and deprived the New England 
Patriots of a draft pick for their involvement in spying on an opposing team).  Goodell 
followed the guidelines under the Constitution for disciplining a coach or team for a 
violation of the competitive aspects of the game.  NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31. 
108 NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31–34.  The Executive Committee is made up of one 
representative from each team.  Id. at 23. 
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c. Grievance Procedures Available for Players 
The NFL CBA, entered into by League management and the NFLPA, 
governs the terms and conditions of employment in the NFL.109  It is the 
preeminent document in terms of governance over the League‘s 
disciplinary and grievance policies.110  The NFL CBA states two 
procedures for player appeals:  the grievance procedure and an appeal to 
the commissioner.111 
The Non-Injury Grievance procedures in Article IX of the NFL CBA 
govern disputes over team discipline of a player.112  A player may file a 
grievance about a dispute that involves interpretation of the CBA.113  The 
procedure begins with filing a grievance, continues with the selection of 
arbitrators, and ends with a hearing that results in the arbitrator‘s final 
decision.114  Thus, Article IX appears to give a player an opportunity for 
                                                 
109 Preamble, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 3, 
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).  League management is 
represented by the NFL Management Council (―NFLMC‖) while the NFLPA represents the 
players.  Id. 
110 See Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1040 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that in the case of a dispute, a bargaining agreement takes precedence over other 
documents because of the national policy encouraging uniform labor law and arbitration); 
1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 139 
(1986) (explaining that in the case of a dispute, a mutually agreed-upon collective 
agreement takes precedence); see also Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing the 
hierarchy of the league governing documents). 
111 Non-Injury Grievance, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 23, 
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (discussing the process of the 
grievance procedure, which includes filing, notice, hearing, and the arbitrator‘s award); 
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (explaining that when a player is disciplined by 
the commissioner for conduct detrimental to the NFL, the commissioner will hear all 
appeals); see also NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 252, 254 (explaining that under the 
Player Contract an arbitrator comes into play in two situations:  injury grievances and 
disputes over the interpretation of the Contract).  These situations give way to the 
procedure outlined in the current NFL CBA.  Id. 
112 Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 20.  ―Any dispute involved in Club discipline may be 
made the subject of a non-injury grievance under Article IX.‖  Id. 
113 Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 23. 
114 Id. at 23–27.  A player, team, the league management, or the NFLPA must file a 
grievance within forty-five days of the incident on which the grievance is based and 
provide written notice to the NFL and the parties involved.  Id. at 23.  If the grievance is not 
resolved following an answer from the opposing parties, an appeal may be made by filing 
a written notice with the Notice Arbitrator.  Id. at 23–24.  ―[E]ach party will submit to the 
other copies of all documents, reports and records relevant to the dispute‖ no later than ten 
days prior to the hearing.  Id. at 24.  The hearing will take place in front of an arbitration 
panel made up of four arbitrators jointly accepted by the NFLPA and Management 
Council.  Id. at 24–25.  Each party has the right to discharge any of the arbitrators by 
serving written notice on the arbitrator and the opposing party.  Id.  An arbitrator will be 
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independent arbitration.  However, a clause in the opening section 
supersedes its application by requiring players to use any of the other 
dispute resolution procedures included in the CBA, such as an appeal to 
the commissioner.115 
Players disciplined by the commissioner for conduct that is 
detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, professional 
football can appeal to the commissioner in writing.116  Upon receiving an 
appeal, the commissioner, or a person designated by the commissioner, 
will preside over a hearing in which the player may be represented by 
counsel and may present all relevant evidence.117  Yet, the 
commissioner‘s written decision is the ―final and complete disposition of 
the dispute and will be binding upon the player(s) and Club(s) 
involved.‖118  That final authority is a part of the NFL commissioner‘s 
broad authority under the Personal Conduct Policy.119 
d. Personal Conduct Policy 
The NFL league management and owners created the Conduct 
Policy in May 2000 as a response to increased criminal conduct by NFL 
players.120  This policy symbolized the NFL‘s prevention-first attitude by 
                                                                                                             
chosen from the remaining candidates based on his available dates.  Id. at 25–26.  Parties 
involved will have the right to present all evidence relevant to the grievance including 
witnesses.  Id.  The arbitrator will issue a written decision which may not alter the 
provisions of the CBA in any way or grant additional remedies not provided for in the 
CBA.  Id. at 26; see also Impartial Arbitrator, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–
2012, 152, http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING% 
20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (providing a 
complete description of the role of an independent arbitrator as utilized in the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement); Injury Grievance, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 28, 
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (listing nearly identical 
procedures for an injury grievance). 
115 Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 23.  Grievances filed under this section give 
way to any CBA procedure that requires an impartial arbitrator, special master, or the court 
system to resolve the dispute.  Id. 
116 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34.  Appeals must be submitted to the 
commissioner in writing within twenty days of receiving the punishment.  Id. 
117 Id. at 34–35.  The hearing takes place within ten days of the receipt of notice of appeal.  
Id. at 34.  The commissioner confers with the Executive Director of the NFLPA regarding 
who will serve as the commissioner‘s designee.  Id. 
118 Id.  The commissioner may alter, but never increase, fines and suspensions for on-field 
unnecessary roughness or unsportsmanlike conduct penalties.  Id. 
119 See infra Part II.B.1.d (explaining how the creation of the Policy increased the 
commissioner‘s disciplinary authority, which includes disciplining misconduct that falls 
short of criminal behavior). 
120 Don Banks, Taking a Stand Against Violence:  League Adopts Broader ‗Personal Conduct 
Policy,‘ CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2000, 9:27 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
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focusing more on deterring future misconduct through preventative 
programs.121  Despite the creation of the Conduct Policy, players 
continued to engage in off-field misconduct when Goodell became 
commissioner in 2006.122  As a result, Goodell responded with longer 
suspensions and a stricter Personal Conduct Policy in both writing and 
application.123 
                                                                                                             
com/football/nfl/news/2000/05/23/banks_tuesdaymeetings/; see also Joe Donatelli & 
Thomas O‘Toole, Wake Up, NFL:  You‘ve Got a Violence Problem, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2000), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=329054&type=story (discussing the increasing 
occurrences of player misconduct that include violence); Guilty on Three of Four:  Jury 
Acquits Carruth on First-Degree Murder Charge, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 19, 2001, 3:41 
PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/nfl/news/2001/01/19/carruth_trial_ap/ 
(discussing Rae Carruth, who was found guilty of conspiracy to murder his child‘s 
mother); Lewis Murder Charges Dropped:  Ravens Star Accepts Misdemeanor Charge, Will 
Testify, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 5, 2000, 9:31 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
com/football/nfl/news/2000/06/04/lewis_agreement/ (explaining the situation in which 
Ray Lewis pled guilty to obstruction of justice charges, avoiding possible charges for 
aggravated assault and murder stemming from an incident that left two men dead); Brent 
Schrotenboer, NFL Arrests Database, SIGNONSANDIEGO, http://legacy.signonsandiego. 
com/sports/nfl/arrests.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (listing the arrests of NFL players 
and the resulting punishments).  Between January 1, 2000, and the implementation of the 
Conduct Policy in May 2000, there were nearly twenty incidents that resulted in arrests or 
citations more serious than speeding tickets.  Id.  These incidents included charges of 
murder, assault, various drugs and weapons charges, felony theft, sexual assault, domestic 
violence, and driving under the influence.  Id. 
121 Banks, supra note 120. 
122 King, supra note 23; see also Judy Battista, Goodell Says He‘ll Punish N.F.L.‘s Problem 
Players, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/sports/ 
football/27nfl.html [hereinafter Battista, Problem Players] (discussing NFL players that 
would become ―targets of Goodell‘s tougher personal-conduct policy‖); Timeline of Trouble 
for Pacman Jones, supra note 23 (discussing plans by Goodell to meet with several players 
regarding their run-ins with the law).  Prior to the 2007 season, Adam ―Pacman‖ Jones had 
been arrested and charged with various felonies and misdemeanors on numerous 
occasions.  Id.; see also Schrotenboer, supra note 120 (listing the arrests of NFL players and 
the resulting punishments since 2000).  In the time period between the creation of the 
Conduct Policy in May 2000, and the hiring of Commissioner Goodell in 2006, there were at 
least 218 incidents alleging NFL players of criminal conduct and resulting in either arrest or 
citation.  Schrotenboer, supra note 120.  Since January 1, 2000, there have been more than 
475 incidents of alleged criminal conduct by NFL players.  Id.; see also NFL Aims to Tackle 
Public Relations Problem of Player Arrests!, TOTAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE, 
http://www.totalcriminaldefense.com/news/celebrity-spotlight/miscellaneous/nfl-
player-arrests.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) (explaining that 40% of the arrests since 2000 
have come from about fifty players or 3% of the players in the league). 
123 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2; Judy Battista, N.F.L. Assesses Lengthy Bans for 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9B01EFDE123FF932A25757C0A 9619C8B63 [hereinafter Battista, Bans for Misconduct] 
(explaining that Goodell suspended Adam Jones and Chris Henry in order to protect the 
integrity of the NFL); New Commish Goodell Gets Tough Defending ‗Shield,‘ CBS SPORTS (Apr. 
10, 2007), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/10119610 (discussing the importance of a 
strict conduct policy in defending the integrity and reputation of the league from illegal 
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The new Policy reiterates that players, coaches, and other NFL 
employees are required to refrain from conduct detrimental to the 
NFL.124  The language now states that the League expects the players to 
act ―in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon which the 
league is based, and is lawful.‖125  The standard of conduct in the 
Personal Conduct Policy is higher than simply avoiding criminal activity 
because conduct does not need to reach the level of criminal liability to 
be in violation of the Policy.126 
The Personal Conduct Policy grants the commissioner broad 
disciplinary authority with little restriction.127  The player‘s only 
appellate right under the CBA is for a hearing in front of the 
commissioner.128  The implementation of this broad authority has led 
critics to frame it as a violation of the NLRA, which regulates the 
                                                                                                             
and irresponsible conduct).  Compare Schrotenboer, supra note 120 (stating that in 2006, 
Jared Allen received a two-game suspension following a second arrest in less than five 
months for driving under the influence, and reporting that Ray Lewis was fined $250,000 
based on charges of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in the death of two 
men and his guilty plea for obstruction of justice), with NFL Aims to Tackle Public Relations 
Problem of Player Arrests, supra note 122 (explaining that Goodell suspended Adam Jones for 
an entire season without pay, which resulted in a loss of more than $1.2 million in salary, 
restricted Jones from going to any night clubs, and gave Jones a curfew following several 
arrests, including his final arrest for which he was sentenced to one year of probation). 
124 Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 1. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 1.  A player can be disciplined for any improper conduct, even if it merely 
presents a risk of damaging the reputation of the NFL.  Id. at 1–2.  Misconduct includes 
conduct that imposes an inherent danger to others as well as conduct that impairs the 
integrity or reputation of the NFL and its teams.  Id. at 2.  This includes any threatening 
behavior towards players, coaches, or other league employees in or outside the workplace.  
Id. at 1; see also Young Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at 577–78 (discussing the differences 
between the Conduct Policy and the previous policy).  The new Policy is in ―stark contrast 
to the NFL‘s previous conduct policy, which required the NFL Commissioner to withhold 
punishment of an athlete unless there was a conviction or some form of plea by the 
athlete.‖  Young, Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at 578. 
127 Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3.  The Conduct Policy contains no 
restrictions on the magnitude of punishment, stating only that upon completion of an 
investigation into alleged improper conduct, ―the Commissioner will have full authority to 
impose discipline as warranted.‖  Id. at 2. 
128 Id. at 3.  The Personal Conduct Policy states that players that appeal disciplinary 
decisions are ―entitled to a prompt hearing pursuant to Article XI of the [CBA] and the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws, to be conducted by the Commissioner or his designee.‖  Id.; see 
also Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating that all appeals will be made to the 
commissioner); Jim Wyatt, Commissioner Hears ‗Pacman‘ Jones‘ Appeal, USA TODAY, May 12, 
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/titans/2007-05-11-pacman-appeal_ 
N.htm (explaining that Commissioner Goodell would preside over Adam Jones‘ appellate 
hearing for discipline for off-field misconduct).  Because any further appeal could only be 
to the commissioner under the Conduct Policy, Jones‘s only other option would be a 
lawsuit through the court system.  Wyatt, supra. 
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relationship between labor unions and workers and requires both 
impartiality and collective bargaining of all rules and policies that will 
have a practical effect on the working conditions of employees.129  
Working conditions in the NFL include salary and player movement.130  
Because the commissioner created the Conduct Policy, controls the 
magnitude of punishments, and sits as the final arbiter for players 
disciplined under the policy, the NFL may be violating the NLRA.131  
The disciplinary structure and appeal rights under the Policy that 
provide this broad and improper authority to the commissioner are 
significantly different from the structures of other professional sports 
leagues.132 
                                                 
129 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).  Under the NLRA, employees designate representatives 
that shall collectively bargain for ―rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment.‖  Id. § 159(a); see also Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. 
NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that the commissioner violated the NLRA ―by 
unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule‖ that would institute an automatic fine 
for any player that left the bench during a fight or altercation on the field); Pollack, supra 
note 78, at 1709 (discussing the effect of the Conduct Policy on working conditions); infra 
Part III.B (explaining how the Policy can be characterized as affecting working conditions 
without collective bargaining). 
130 See infra text accompanying note 217 (discussing rules that affect the salary of players 
and therefore affect working conditions). 
131 See Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players 
Association:  How Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union‘s Members by Not 
Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1593–98 (2008) 
(discussing concerns regarding an inherent lack of impartiality by the commissioner in the 
exercise of his disciplinary authority); infra Part III.B (discussing the implementation of the 
Policy as a working condition); see also Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 
432 F. Supp. 1213, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (recognizing that a commissioner‘s authority to 
issue disciplinary action is framed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement).  If 
the commissioner exercises his or her punitive authority outside the scope of the 
agreement, the commissioner breaches that agreement.  Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, 
Inc., 432 F. Supp. at 1226; see also Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football 
League Players Ass‘n, 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 969 (1973) (explaining that a unilateral change in a 
working condition constitutes an unfair labor practice that violates the collective 
bargaining agreement); In re Arbitration Among Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, Nat‘l 
Football League Mgmt. Council, & Nat‘l Football League (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.), cited 
in Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts By National 
Football League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 
15 (1987) (imposing a new drug testing program would be a unilateral change in the 
conditions of employment, which were not collectively bargained).  But see Marquez v. 
Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998) (recognizing that a labor union has a duty 
of fair representation under § 9(a) of the NLRA).  While the NFLPA may not have been in 
breach by allowing the unilateral implementation of the Conduct Policy, it does have a 
duty of fair representation ―to serve the interests of all members without hostility or 
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, 
and to avoid arbitrary conduct.‖  Id. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)). 
132 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the disciplinary structures of the MLB and NBA). 
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2. Discipline in Major League Baseball 
In 1921, Major League Baseball (―MLB‖) became one of the first of 
the major professional sports leagues to create the office of the 
commissioner, doing so through the Major League Agreement 
(―MLA‖).133  Kenesaw Landis became the first MLB commissioner in 
response to the gambling problems that were tarnishing the image of the 
game.134  Landis first exercised his power by banning from baseball each 
of the Chicago White Sox players who allegedly threw the 1919 World 
Series, although each player was acquitted of related charges in state 
court.135  Parties challenged this powerful authority vested in the MLB 
Commissioner‘s office but the courts found it valid under the MLA.136 
The Major League Constitution, formerly the MLA, and the Basic 
Agreement, MLB‘s collective bargaining agreement, establish the MLB‘s 
authority to punish misconduct.137  Under the Constitution, the MLB 
Commissioner may punish players and other employees for conduct that 
is not in the best interests of the League.138  The Basic Agreement creates 
                                                 
133 Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain:  Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct 
Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 1069, 
1080 (2008) (discussing the shaping of the MLB Commissioner‘s authority and the 
appointment of Landis as the first commissioner); see also Major League Agreement, THE BIZ 
OF BASEBALL (Aug. 30, 2006, 11:32), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=58:1921-major-league-agreemen&catid=37:1900-1960&Item 
id=47. 
134 Ambrose, supra note 133, at 1080.  ―In the early days of baseball, open gambling was 
as common as a well-executed sacrifice bunt. Gamblers filled the stands and bet on 
everything, including individual at bats.‖  Wayne S. Quirk, Baseball‘s Big Inning:  The 
Sacrifice of the 1919 Black Sox, in SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES 111, 113 (Charles 
E. Quirk ed., 1996); see also Pachman, supra note 78, at 1414 (discussing the Black Sox 
scandal); Pollack, supra note 78, at 1650–58 (discussing the era of MLB leadership under 
Landis). 
135 See Judge Landis Bars ―Clean‖ Sox from Baseball Forever, N.Y. WORLD, Aug. 3, 1921, at 3 
(explaining Commissioner Landis‘s decision to ban players that bet on the 1919 World 
Series); The Chicago Black Sox Banned From Baseball, ESPN CLASSIC (Nov. 19, 2003), 
http://espn.go.com/classic/s/black_sox_moments.html (detailing the timeline of the 
scandal beginning from the initial allegations to the banishment of the players by the 
commissioner). 
136 Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (explaining that 
while the commissioner was given broad authority, it was valid under the language agreed 
upon in the Major League Agreement); see also Young Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at 
575–76 (discussing the development of the best interests authority in the MLB that 
coincided with Landis‘s decision to banish the baseball players involved in the scandal). 
137 Major League Constitution, supra note 89, at 2; MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27. 
138 Major League Constitution, supra note 89, at 2; see also Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball 
Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (1977) (upholding Kuhn‘s punishment of Ted Turner 
for detrimental actions); Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing the creation of the 
MLA and the authority granted to its commissioner). 
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the disciplinary structure and a grievance procedure.139  Article XII of the 
Basic Agreement states that a player may be disciplined for just cause by 
his team, the vice president of on-field operations, or the 
commissioner.140  The just cause requirement in the Basic Agreement 
mandates that player discipline be reasonably commensurate with the 
conduct.141 
Once a valid party disciplines a player, the player may utilize the 
multi-step grievance procedure outlined in Article XI if he feels the 
disciplinary decision was improper.142  The grievance could ultimately 
go to independent arbitration if the initial steps of the procedure do not 
result in settlement.143  Procedural protections include requirements for 
notice of the investigation and discipline of a player as well as full 
discovery of all documents and evidence found in the investigation.144  
                                                 
139 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32–45. 
140 Id. at 43. 
141 See id. (explaining that when a grievance is filed, the issue to be resolved is whether 
there was just cause for the punishment); infra Part III.D (discussing the use of various 
standards of review including just cause); see also In re Arbitration Between Major League 
Baseball Players Ass‘n & Comm‘r of Major League Baseball (1992) (Nicolau, Arb.), reprinted 
in 1 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 541 (1992) 
[hereinafter MLBPA v. Comm‘r] (explaining that the standard of review for the 
commissioner‘s decision to ban Steve Howe from baseball was just cause); Pollack, supra 
note 78, at 1693–94 (discussing an arbitrator‘s definition of just cause as a standard of 
review for the punishment of baseball pitcher Steve Howe).  There was no just cause for the 
suspension of Steve Howe because the punishment was not ―reasonably commensurate 
with the offense‖ or ―appropriate, given all the circumstances.‖  Pollack, supra note 78, at 
1693–94.  See generally Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of ―Just Cause‖ 
in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594 (1985) (discussing the use of just cause as a 
standard review for disciplinary decisions in other professional industries). 
142 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43. 
143 See id. at 38.  The first step of the procedure involves the player discussing the matter 
with a designated team representative.  Id. at 36.  If no settlement is reached, the player will 
submit a written notice of grievance to that representative who will then render a decision.  
Id.  Secondly, a player may appeal the representative‘s decision to a designated 
representative of the Major League Labor Relations Department (―LRD‖).  Id.  After 
meeting to discuss the matter, the representative of the LRD will issue a decision.  Id.  
Appeal of that decision would go to arbitration.  Id. at 37.  The arbitration hearing will 
involve one impartial arbitrator.  Id. at 38.  If the parties disagree on this point, there will be 
a panel of three arbitrators:  the impartial arbitrator plus an additional arbitrator chosen by 
each side.  Id.  The full and final decision of the arbitrator or arbitration panel may affirm, 
modify, or reverse the previous decision.  Id.  Arbitration hearings are conducted under the 
Rules of Procedure listed in the Basic Agreement.  Id.; see also id. at 226 (delineating the 
Rules of Procedure used in Grievance Arbitration Hearings). 
144 Id. at 44–45.  A disciplined player and the MLBPA must receive written notice of the 
discipline.  Id. at 44.  Reasonable advance notice of any investigatory interview is required.  
Id. at 45.  ―A [p]layer who is disciplined shall have the right to discover, in timely fashion, 
all documents and evidence adduced during any investigation of the charges involved.‖  
Id. at 44. 
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The MLB Basic Agreement (―MLB CBA‖) employs one impartial 
arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, two of whom are chosen by the 
respective parties.145  If parties disagree on the arbitrator, the American 
Arbitration Association provides a list from which parties can choose an 
arbitrator.146 
A player may not file a grievance, however, if it concerns an action 
taken by the commissioner involving ―the preservation of the integrity 
of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball.‖147  
Furthermore, at any point during the process, the commissioner may 
determine that the conduct in question involves the integrity of the game 
and remove it from the grievance process.148  If either situation arises, the 
commissioner will issue a decision that constitutes ―full, final and 
complete disposition of [the] complaint.‖149  Consequently, a MLB player 
is not always assured an appeal; rather, it depends upon the section of 
the Basic Agreement under which the punishment is levied.150 
The 2005 suspension of Kenny Rogers by MLB Commissioner Bud 
Selig demonstrates the importance of the distinction between an 
appealable and a non-appealable disciplinary decision.151  Selig 
suspended Rogers for twenty games and fined him $50,000 following an 
altercation with a television cameraman.152  Although Selig could have 
punished Rogers for detrimental conduct under Article XI(A)(1)(b) so 
that Rogers would have had no right to appeal, he issued the suspension 
                                                 
145 Id. at 35. 
146 See id. (explaining that in the event of a disagreement, the AAA provides a list of 
arbitrators from which each party will eliminate names until they come to an agreement on 
one name to be the impartial arbitrator). 
147 Id. at 32.   
148 Id. at 33. 
149 Id.  The hearing in front of the commissioner follows the procedural rules set out in 
Appendix A of the MLB CBA.  Id. at 32. 
150 See Marks, supra note 131, at 1619–21 (discussing Commissioner Bud Selig‘s decision 
to suspend Kenny Rogers under Article XII of the MLB CBA, thereby preserving Rogers‘s 
use of the grievance procedure); see also Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Comm‘r of 
Major League Baseball (John Rocker Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS 
AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2001, at 765 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course 
Handbook Series No. G-638, 2001) (stating that Commissioner Bud Selig‘s punishment of 
pitcher John Rocker was excessive).  Selig‘s suspension of Rocker under the MLB CBA 
allowed Rocker to appeal to an independent arbitrator.  Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 
supra, at 769. 
151 Selig Suspends Rogers for ‗Unprofessional‘ Act, NBC SPORTS (July 2, 2005, 7:11 p.m.), 
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/8409624/. 
152 Id.  Rogers pushed two cameramen to the ground causing minor physical injury to 
one.  Id.  Rogers also threw one camera to the ground while the cameramen were 
attempting to film Rogers walking from the dugout to the field prior to a home game.  Id. 
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and fine under Article XII of the Basic Agreement instead.153  As a result, 
Rogers retained the right to appeal Selig‘s decision, which he did by 
filing a grievance that went to arbitration.154  The arbitrator determined 
that Selig‘s punishment was excessive and reduced the suspension to 
thirteen games.155  Thus, an arbitrator may limit the MLB 
Commissioner‘s disciplinary authority, similar to the practice in the 
NBA.156 
3. Disciplinary Procedures in the National Basketball Association 
The NBA Uniform Player Contract (―NBA UPC‖) details the level of 
conduct that players must uphold.157  Section 5 requires a player to 
refrain from doing ―anything that is materially detrimental or materially 
prejudicial to the best interests of the Team or the League.‖158  Finally, 
the NBA UPC requires players to adhere to Article 35 of the NBA 
Constitution, which provides a more detailed listing of conduct expected 
of an NBA player.159  If a player makes or endorses any statement or acts 
in a way that is detrimental to the best interests of the NBA, he may be 
                                                 
153 Marks, supra note 131, at 1619; see also MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32 
(stating that an action which was taken ―by the [c]ommissioner involving the preservation 
of the integrity of . . . the game of baseball‖ cannot give rise to the use of the grievance 
procedure in Article XI). 
154 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43.  Article XII of the MLB CBA allows the 
commissioner to discipline a player for just cause and provides the Grievance Procedure 
through which players can seek review of the reasonableness of such discipline.  Id. at 43–
45; Rogers Loses Appeal in Altercation with Cameraman, ESPN (July 28, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2117962; see also Marks, supra note 131, at 
1620 (discussing the suspension of Rogers under a section that allowed for independent 
review). 
155 Tim Brown, Rogers‘ Suspension Is Shortened, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2005), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/10/sports/sp-basenotes10.  The arbitrator also 
ordered any fines to be paid to charity and held that the detrimental effect of the 
suspension on incentives clauses in Rogers‘ contract was excessive.  Id.; Jack Curry, 
Palmeiro and Rogers Making Back-to-Back Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9504E5DD143EF933A2575BC0A9639C8
B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
156 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing arbitrators‘ decisions in cases involving NBA 
commissioner discipline). 
157 National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract, NBA PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, A-2 
to A-3, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 
2010) [hereinafter NBA Contract]. 
158 Id. at A-2.  Conduct must be at the level of ―the highest standards of honesty, 
citizenship, and sportsmanship.‖  Id.  The Commissioner‘s disciplinary decision under this 
section is ―final, binding, conclusive, and unappealable.‖  Id. at A-3. 
159 Id.; see also Misconduct, supra note 89 (explaining that misconduct involves actions in 
violation of the best interests of the game, actions that are illegal, gambling on any game, 
and tampering with a player or coach already under contract).  Conduct must ―conform to 
standards of morality or fair play.‖  Id. at art. 35(e). 
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subject to a commissioner-imposed fine or suspension.160  Furthermore, 
conduct that ―does not conform to standards of morality or fair play, that 
does not comply at all times with all federal, state, and local laws‖ can 
result in a suspension.161 
All disciplinary decisions of the commissioner are subject to review 
by the Board of Governors and are then appealable under the grievance 
and arbitration procedure of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(―NBA CBA‖).162  A formal grievance must state the issues and must be 
filed within a certain time limit.163  Both parties agree on a grievance 
arbitrator and retain the ability to discharge that arbitrator.164  Discovery 
                                                 
160 Misconduct, supra note 89, at A-14. 
161 Id.; see also Mike Wise, Image-Conscious N.B.A. Suspends Iverson and Rider, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/04/sports/pro-basketball-image-
conscious-nba-suspends-iverson-and-rider.html (discussing NBA Commissioner David 
Stern‘s decision to suspend Allen Iverson and Isaiah Rider following separate criminal 
charges).  Stern suspended Iverson for one game after he pled no-contest to charges 
stemming from weapons and drug possession charges.  Wise, supra.  Stern suspended 
Rider for two games following a no-contest plea to illegal possession of cell phones and a 
conviction for possession of marijuana.  Id.  Stern cited Article 35 of the NBA Constitution 
in imposing the suspensions.  Id.  In discussing the importance of players‘ character and a 
positive league image, Stern stated that ―criminal conduct is not part of acceptable life in 
the N.B.A.‖  Id. 
162 Misconduct, supra note 89, at A-15; Grievance and Arbitration Procedure and Special 
Procedures with Respect to Disputes Involving Player Discipline, NAT‘L BASKETBALL PLAYERS 
ASS‘N, 326–42, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20XXXI.pdf 
[hereinafter Grievance/Arbitration Procedure].  A player must discuss his complaint with the 
adverse party before filing a formal grievance.  Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra, at 327; 
see also Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD), 
2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (discussing the case in which a grievance arbitrator 
reduced Jermaine O‘Neal‘s twenty-five game suspension for an altercation with fans 
during an NBA game to fifteen games because it was without just cause).  Nat‘l Basketball 
Ass‘n, 2005 WL 22869, at *1.  A federal district court held that the suspension was arbitrable 
and upheld the arbitrator‘s reduction of the suspension.  Id. at *10; see also In re Nat‘l 
Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors Basketball Club & Nat‘l 
Basketball Ass‘n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) (Feerick, Arb.) [hereinafter In re 
Sprewell] (discussing how Latrell Sprewell, who was suspended from the NBA for one 
year in 1997 after he attacked and choked his head coach during practice, successfully 
appealed his suspension to a grievance arbitrator).  The arbitrator reduced the suspension 
because he found that the commissioner‘s decision was not in the interest of ―justice and 
fairness.‖  In re Sprewell 591 PLI/Pat at 573. 
163 Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 330–31. 
164 Id. at 333.  In the event disagreement persists, outside help is obtained from the 
Conflict Prevention & Resolution Institute.  Id.  Recognizing the importance of impartiality, 
none of the possible arbitrators have any recent business affiliation or relationship with 
professional athletes or leagues.  Id. 
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of non-privileged documents is available to each party.165  The grievance 
arbitrator will hear the dispute and issue an award.166 
Despite successful player appeals, the NBA CBA, like the MLB 
governing documents, maintains a provision that removes the review of 
the disciplinary decisions from an arbitrator and gives final disposition 
to the commissioner or his designee.167  If the commissioner‘s decision 
concerns the integrity of the game and results in a financial impact of 
$50,000 or less, any appeal must be made to the commissioner.168  
However, if the financial impact of the discipline is greater than $50,000, 
the player may bring an appeal before the grievance arbitrator who will 
apply an ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of review to the 
commissioner‘s decision.169 
The NBA‘s policy, as well as the MLB‘s, reflects a pro-arbitration 
stance lacking in the NFL:  both leagues‘ commissioners maintain broad 
disciplinary authority, including best interests authority, which an 
independent voice can review.170  Incorporation of independent 
arbitration by the NBA and the MLB in its grievance procedures is 
representative of the development of and support for arbitration found 
                                                 
165 Id. at 330–31. 
166 Id. at 331–32.  The arbitrator is chosen by both sides for the duration of the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 333.  In the event that both parties cannot agree on an 
arbitrator, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (―the CPR 
Institute‖) will provide a list of eleven attorneys from which the parties will choose an 
arbitrator.  Id. at 333–34.  Questions of substantive arbitrability will be determined in a 
judicial proceeding in federal court in the Southern District of New York.  Id. at 332; see also 
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 787 (discussing the distinction between substantive 
arbitrability and procedural arbitrability). 
167 Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 335; see also cases cited supra note 162 
(discussing cases in which NBA players successfully appealed a commissioner‘s 
disciplinary decision). 
168 Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 335. 
169 Id. at 336; see also In re Sprewell, supra note 162 (discussing Latrell Sprewell‘s appeal of 
his suspension for attacking his coach).  A ruling is not arbitrary and capricious if there was 
―a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.‖  Friends of Yosemite 
Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2008). 
170 Compare Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 336 (allowing an NBA 
player to appeal a commissioner‘s suspension or fine for conduct detrimental to the NBA to 
an independent arbitrator if the punishment is of sufficient magnitude), and MLB Basic 
Agreement, supra note 27, at 43 (stating that an MLB player can use the grievance procedure 
to determine if the commissioner had just cause for a disciplinary decision), and supra text 
accompanying note 153–54 (explaining that MLB Commissioner Selig suspended Kenny 
Rogers so that he maintained a right to an appellate hearing with an independent 
arbitrator), with Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that a NFL player‘s only 
appellate right is for a hearing conducted by the commissioner or his designee).  The NFL 
Personal Conduct Policy refers to the procedure in Article XI of the NFL CBA, which 
directs all appeals to the commissioner or his designee.  Commissioner Discipline, supra note 
9, at 34. 
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in courts and from legislators.171  The unilateral implementation of the 
NFL Personal Conduct Policy, absent procedural safeguards and an 
independent process, has resulted in the possible violation of arbitration 
principles as well as players with nominal appeal rights and a 
commissioner with excessive authority. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The disciplinary structure of the NFL, defined most recently by the 
Personal Conduct Policy, precludes an outside body from reviewing the 
commissioner‘s punishment of players for off-field misconduct.172  
Although the NFL Commissioner‘s authority to decide what is 
detrimental to the best interests of the League is similar to the power of 
commissioners in other leagues, the procedural safeguards are less 
defined.173  Instead of independent arbitration, decisions under the 
Policy are reviewed only by what may be a biased voice.174 
Courts and legislatures have created a policy to support arbitration 
clauses.175  Additionally, courts have utilized the arbitration process to 
promote efficiency, impartiality, and the rights of all parties.176  The 
protections inherent in the arbitration process are absent from the 
method of discipline for off-field misconduct utilized by the NFL, whose 
policy contains features that may be impermissible under the FAA or the 
NLRA.177 
Part III.A of this Note evaluates the NFL commissioner‘s role as the 
arbiter of disputes under arbitration law with a specific look at the 
question of impartiality.178  Part III.B examines the implementation of the 
                                                 
171 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the increase in popularity of the use of arbitration in 
labor disputes). 
172 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining the NFL Commissioner‘s 
authority to discipline and preside over appellate hearings); supra Part II.B.1.c (discussing 
the grievance procedures available to NFL players). 
173 See infra Part III.E (detailing the similarities and differences among league operating 
agreements). 
174 See infra Part III.A (discussing the role of the commissioner in hearing disputes under 
the rules of the FAA). 
175 See supra Part II.A (discussing the development of arbitration in the courts and 
legislatures). 
176 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that partiality prevents a person from acting as an arbitrator 
when a material relationship with an arguing party is established); supra Part II.A.2 
(discussing the arbitration principles gleaned from court holdings). 
177 See infra Part III.A–B (discussing the NFL Commissioner as arbiter of his rulings and 
outlining the implementation of the Conduct Policy). 
178 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the NFL commissioner as a final arbiter under 
arbitration laws). 
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Personal Conduct Policy as a unilaterally employed working 
condition.179  Next, Part III.C analyzes the scope of authority vested in a 
commissioner to discipline for detrimental conduct not in the ―best 
interests‖ of the league.180  Part III.D explores the various standards of 
review that leagues have used in analyzing disciplinary decisions.181  
Finally, Part III.E compares the procedural safeguards in the NFL, NBA, 
and MLB‘s operating agreements.182 
A. Analyzing the Commissioner‘s Role as Final Arbiter Under Current 
Arbitration Laws 
One of the greatest concerns about the current disciplinary structure 
in the NFL is whether the commissioner is able to maintain the desired 
impartiality as the final authority in the appeals process.183  The NFL 
CBA gives the commissioner the power not only to discipline the players 
but also to give the ―full, final and complete disposition‖ of any 
appeal.184  In addition, he maintains a close working relationship with 
both the owners and the NFL Management Council.185  Management 
even chooses and provides compensation for the commissioner.186  Thus, 
there is a clear material relationship between the final arbiter, in this case 
the NFL commissioner, and a party that results in evident partiality in 
the resolution of a player‘s grievance.  The player suffers because the 
                                                 
179 See infra Part III.B (discussing the possibly improper implementation of the Personal 
Conduct Policy). 
180 See infra Part III.C (examining the ―best interests‖ authority vested in the 
commissioner). 
181 See infra Part III.D (discussing standards of review used in professional sports 
leagues). 
182 See infra Part III.E (discussing the procedural safeguards in professional sports 
leagues‘ governing documents). 
183 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 16 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(explaining that the NFL governing documents put the commissioner in the role of 
arbitrator that requires impartiality).  The court reasoned that ―when he acts in the capacity 
of an arbiter, he must act in an impartial manner within the authority given to him by the 
[CBA], and that he must decide matters presented to him on the basis of the evidence 
submitted by the parties.‖  Id. 
184 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34.  The final appeal may also be heard by a 
commissioner designee.  Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the commissioner‘s 
decisions under the NFL governing documents). 
185 See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the interaction between the commissioner, the 
owners, and the NFL Management Council in the implementation of the conduct policy); 
see also supra note 109 (explaining the relationship between the NFLMC and NFL owners). 
186 NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28. 
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NFL commissioner, also influenced by management, plays the role of 
both prosecutor and judge.187 
The FAA clearly states that a court may overturn an arbitration 
award when there is evidence that an arbitrator has been biased in his 
judgment.188  Impartiality is difficult to maintain because a commissioner 
responsible for an entire league will do what is in the best interest of the 
league and disregard the interests of the individual players.189  This 
could result in the commissioner‘s tendency to be biased and adversarial 
to those players he disciplines.190  The fact that the commissioner, who 
creates, enforces, and interprets the rules, is not a disinterested party 
violates the standards of the arbitration process.191 
The NFL Player Contract mentions the American Arbitration 
Association (―AAA‖), which requires impartiality by all arbitrators.192  
The AAA labor arbitration rules explain that an arbitrator is not neutral 
if that person ―has any financial or personal interest in the result of the 
arbitration.‖193  If this language were applied to the NFL, there could be 
                                                 
187 See supra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that when the commissioner disciplines a player and 
the player appeals the commissioner‘s decision, the commissioner presides as the 
arbitrator). 
188 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006).  A court may vacate an arbitration award ―where there was 
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.‖  Id. 
189 See Shaun Payne, Hugh Fullerton and the Press‘s Revealing Coverage of the Black Sox 
Scandal, 1919–1921, HISTORIC BASEBALL, http://www.historicbaseball.com/scplayers/ 
jacksonmedia.html (explaining the decision by Commissioner Kenesaw Landis to ban the 
players that allegedly bet on the 1919 World Series).  Landis, the first commissioner of 
Major League Baseball, explained his decision to banish all of the Chicago Black Sox 
players who were found not guilty of throwing the 1919 World Series, by stating the 
following:  ―Just keep in mind that regardless of the verdict of juries, baseball is entirely 
competent to protect itself against the crooks, both inside and outside the game.‖  Id. 
190 See also Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Cont‘l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968) 
(explaining that when the relationship between the arbitrator and a party includes a history 
of minimal business transactions, there is significant evidence of partiality); Applied Indus. 
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a material relationship shows evident partiality precluding a person from 
arbitrating a dispute).  But see Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 
654 F. Supp.2d 960, 963–64 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 
F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that foreseeable partiality that was collectively 
bargained for does not violate the requirement of impartiality). 
191 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137 (defining a material relationship that 
constitutes evident partiality); supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the NFL commissioner‘s 
various roles in the disciplinary structure). 
192 Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 5, 11.  ―The AAA shall establish and maintain 
a Panel of Neutral Labor Arbitrators and shall appoint arbitrators there from as hereinafter 
provided.‖  Id. § 5. 
193 Id. § 17. 
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grounds for removal of the commissioner as arbiter.194  The 
commissioner is essentially a representative of the league management 
that hired him and pays his compensation, thus creating a financial 
conflict.195  Furthermore, a personal conflict could exist because the 
commissioner must review the validity of his own decision.196  Despite 
the conflict, the NFLPA cannot find relief in the AAA labor arbitration 
rules because the NFL CBA‘s injury grievance procedure supersedes the 
arbitration rules in the Player Contract.197 
When a group of NFL players had their suspensions for violations of 
the drug policy upheld, they filed a claim against the NFL and its chief 
legal officer (―CLO‖), who presided as the final arbiter of the dispute, 
arguing that the CLO had extended legal advice to parties involved.198  
In NFLPA v. NFL, the court examined the claim of bias and found that 
there had been no bias beyond the foreseeable partiality.199  The NFLPA 
had ―agreed to a certain amount of partiality in the arbitrator‖ when it 
negotiated the CBA that made the commissioner or one of his officers the 
final arbiter.200  Thus, the commissioner is recognized as partial in his 
role as an arbiter under the CBA.201  The Personal Conduct Policy that 
refers to the procedures of the CBA, however, was not negotiated by the 
NFLPA, making the resulting partiality improper.202 
                                                 
194 See NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28 (explaining that the commissioner, who 
serves as an arbitrator, is elected by and is compensated by members of league 
management). 
195 See supra text accompanying note 186 (explaining that the commissioner is hired and 
paid by the NFL).  But see Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 13–14 (discussing the 
process by which both parties to an arbitration agreement take part in choosing the 
arbitrators). 
196 See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (making the commissioner the final 
authority for disputes). 
197 See NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 254 (recognizing that the NFL CBA 
supersedes AAA procedures). 
198 Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 963–
64 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).  In 
Williams, Kevin Williams, Pat Williams, Charles Grant, Deuce McAllister, and Will Smith 
tested positive for a banned substance in violation of the NFL‘s Policy on Anabolic Steroids 
and Related Substances.  Id. at 963.  The players appealed their resulting suspensions to the 
Commissioner who designated Chief Legal Officer, Jeffrey Pash, as the Hearing Officer.  Id.  
Pash upheld the suspensions and the players appealed to the courts.  Id. at 964–65. 
199 Id. at 969. 
200 Id. at 968. 
201 See id. (discussing the inherent partiality of the commissioner under the NFL CBA). 
202 Compare Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (discussing a negotiated aspect of 
the NFL CBA that makes the commissioner an arbitrator of disputes), with supra text 
accompanying note 26 (stating that the Personal Conduct Policy, which requires the use of 
Article XI of the NFL CBA, was not collectively bargained). 
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Although the commissioner‘s role as final arbiter may exceed the 
scope of the FAA, AAA, and current court rulings, the federal policy 
against partiality is still apparent.203  It is clear that impartiality is 
essential to arbitration, the process that preserves the appeal rights of 
League players.204  There may have been acceptance of the partiality by 
the NFLPA, but the NFLPA did not accept the terms of the Personal 
Conduct Policy, which utilizes the CBA‘s appeals process, through 
negotiation with the NFL.205 
B. Personal Conduct Policy as a Working Condition 
The Personal Conduct Policy was established without negotiation 
between the NFL and the NFLPA.206  The commissioner‘s method of 
promulgating this policy raises the question of whether the Conduct 
Policy affects the players‘ employment conditions.207  Under the NLRA, a 
commissioner or the owners may not make unilateral changes that 
would affect the working conditions negotiated under the CBA.208  
Furthermore, a commissioner cannot enforce a rule or disciplinary 
sanction that contravenes the terms of the CBA.209  The NFL supported 
these principles when former commissioner Pete Rozelle attempted to 
                                                 
203 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the scope of arbitration agreements under the FAA 
and the AAA). 
204 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the importance of impartiality according to statutory 
and judicial principles). 
205 See supra note 26 (explaining how the Conduct Policy was implemented with only 
mere acquiescence from the NFLPA). 
206 See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the implementation of the Personal Conduct Policy). 
207 See Marks, supra note 131, at 1593–98 (discussing the Personal Conduct Policy as a 
possible violation of the NLRA and how a court may rule on such a claim). 
208 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(holding that the commissioner violated the National Labor Relations Act ―by unilaterally 
promulgating and implementing a rule‖ that would institute an automatic fine for any 
player that left the bench during a fight or altercation on the field); Pollack, supra note 78, at 
1709 (discussing the Conduct Policy as a working condition); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) 
(2006) (explaining that an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he refuses to 
bargain collectively). 
209 See Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1219–20 (1977) 
(recognizing that a commissioner‘s authority to hand down disciplinary action is framed 
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement).  If the commissioner exercises 
punitive authority outside the scope of the agreement, the commissioner breaches that 
agreement.  Id. at 1226.  In Atlanta National League Baseball Club, the MLB Commissioner 
fined the Atlanta Braves and denied the team a draft choice after its owner, Ted Turner, 
committed a tampering violation by contacting Gary Matthews, a non-free agent.  Id. at 
1216–17.  Turner and the Braves filed suit and the court held that the sanction imposed by 
the Commissioner depriving the Braves of a draft pick was ultra vires and void.  Id. at 1226. 
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implement a new rule regarding in-game fights that was alleged to be a 
unilateral change to players‘ working conditions.210 
Rozelle put into action a rule that would fine players $200 for leaving 
the bench area during a fight.211  The NFLPA filed a complaint with the 
National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the League had violated 
the NLRA by unilaterally adopting the rule, a process that constituted a 
refusal to bargain.212  The Eighth Circuit ultimately held that the owners, 
not the commissioner, had unilaterally promulgated the rule, violating 
the principles of the NLRA.213  However, if the commissioner played the 
principal role in implementing the rule, it would be improper and 
unethical for him not to include both the owners and the NFLPA in the 
discussion.214  Although Rozelle had the authority to fine players for 
conduct detrimental to the league, he did not have the authority to create 
                                                 
210 See Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, 203 
N.L.R.B. 958, 969 (1973) [hereinafter NFLMC v. NFLPA] (explaining that a unilateral change 
in a working condition is an unfair labor practice that violates the collective bargaining 
agreement); Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n & Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & 
Nat‘l Football League (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.), cited in Ethan Lock, The Legality Under 
the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts By National Football League Owners to Unilaterally 
Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) (explaining that imposing a 
drug testing program would be a change in the conditions of employment that was not 
collectively bargained). 
211 Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d at 13. 
212 Id. at 14; NFLMC v. NFLPA, 203 N.L.R.B. at 958.  The Board held that Commissioner 
Rozelle had promulgated the rule, and that the owners did not commit any unfair labor 
practices because they merely approved Rozelle‘s implementation of the rule. NFLMC v. 
NFLPA, 203 N.L.R.B. at 959.  It further held that the NFLPA had conceded that ―the 
Commissioner has, and always has had, the authority to impose fines for conduct 
detrimental to football with or without the approval of the owners.‖  Id.  The Board viewed 
Rozelle, who realized the need for the rule, as the catalyst for its creation.  Id.  Rozelle felt 
that the rule may affect the competitive aspects of the game and so he referred it to the 
owners and competition committee.  Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (stating that it is an 
unfair labor practice for an employer as a party to a labor agreement ―to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees‖).  Interfering with or prohibiting an 
employee subject to a CBA from engaging in collective bargaining or other negotiating 
activities is also an unfair labor practice.  § 158(a)(1); see also supra Part II.B.1.a (describing 
the authority given to the commissioner to fine players for detrimental conduct). 
213 Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d at 17.  The court looked at whether 
the Board erred in finding that the commissioner had adopted and promulgated the rule.  
Id. at 13.  Only after the owners had voted almost unanimously in favor of the rule did the 
commissioner make the rule effective.  Id.  The court relied on the commissioner‘s 
statement that the rule was created ―pursuant to a resolution passed by the member clubs.‖  
Id. at 16. 
214 See id. at 17 (explaining that as an agent of both the owners and the NFLPA, the 
commissioner creates a ―serious breach of ethics‖ if he does not consult with both parties in 
the promulgation of a rule). 
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the rule.215  No matter the commissioner‘s role in the promulgation of a 
rule, the governing documents of the NFL do not give the commissioner 
the authority to make or change rules that affect the working conditions 
of the players.216 
Based on these holdings, the promulgation of the Personal Conduct 
Policy could be seen as a violation of the NLRA if it is found to affect 
working conditions.217  The Conduct Policy reduces player salaries 
through fines and suspensions and restricts player movement, which 
practically affects the working conditions of players.218  In fact, the 
implementation of the Policy has resulted in greater fines and longer 
suspensions.219  The practical effect of any employment rules on working 
conditions makes them an issue subject to mandatory bargaining.220  
Thus, the Conduct Policy‘s practical effect on player working conditions 
suggests that the Policy must be negotiated. 
The unilateral implementation of the bench-fine rule is similar to the 
implementation of the Conduct Policy.  Yet, when then-Commissioner 
Tagliabue instituted the first conduct policy, he worked with the NFL 
Management Council to implement the guidelines.221  Commissioner 
Goodell consulted with owners and the rest of the League even less than 
Commissioner Tagliabue had before announcing the new Conduct 
                                                 
215 Id. at 15–16.  There was no factual basis for the Board‘s assumption that the 
commissioner created the rule because he had the authority to do so.  Id. at 17. 
216 See id. at 16 n.3 (―It seems clear . . . that whether the Commissioner is an agent of the 
Employers, the joint agent of the Union and the Employers, or an independent third party, 
he has no authority to make changes in practices which affect employment conditions of 
the players.‖). 
217 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (identifying ―wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment‖ as working conditions that may not be altered by the commissioner, but 
must be collectively bargained); Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 
1976) (discussing what courts have defined as mandatory subjects of bargaining). 
218 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject of 
bargaining under the NLRA); Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football 
League Players Ass‘n, 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 961–62 (1973) (explaining that fines reduce a 
player‘s salary, a working condition, and are therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining); 
see also supra note 23 (discussing when Commissioner Goodell has used his authority under 
the Conduct Policy to suspend and fine players); supra note 52 (discussing the absence of 
arms-length bargaining in the creation of the Rozelle Rule). 
219 See Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 26 (discussing the 
punishments of Adam Jones and Chris Henry as well as ―longer suspensions and larger 
fines for individuals who violate the policy‖). 
220 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (―Whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject 
depends not on its form but on its practical effect.‖). 
221 See Banks, supra note 120 (explaining that after two months of internal discussions 
among members of the NFL Management Council, the NFL presented the new Conduct 
Policy at the League meetings). 
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Policy.222  Although it is unclear whether the owners or Goodell was the 
catalyst behind the Policy, it is certain that Goodell unambiguously 
desired its implemention.223  If that desire led to a determining role in the 
promulgation of a rule affecting the working conditions of players, then 
Goodell was assuming a duty that was not his, but was that of a labor 
negotiator.224 
If a claim is filed against Commissioner Goodell for unilaterally 
promulgating a rule that alters the working conditions of the players, a 
court may find sufficient grounds for an NLRA violation.225  On the other 
hand, Goodell has consistently stated that any disciplinary action taken 
under the Conduct Policy has resulted from conduct detrimental to the 
NFL.226  Because the governing documents of the League definitively 
vest in Goodell, as the NFL Commissioner, authority to discipline those 
who harm the best interests of the league, the Policy could be a vehicle 
through which Goodell is legitimately exercising that best interests 
authority.227  Nevertheless, the implementation of the Policy was absent 
                                                 
222 See Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 26 (explaining that 
while there were no official collective bargaining negotiations, Commissioner Goodell did 
meet with NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw prior to announcing the new Conduct 
Policy). 
223 See Battista, Problem Players, supra note 122 (discussing Commissioner Goodell‘s plans 
for the new Conduct Policy as well as his intentions to meet with the owners prior to 
unveiling the policy). 
224 See Preamble, supra note 109, at 3 (discussing the formation of the NFL CBA through 
negotiations between the NFL Management Council and the NFLPA).  The Management 
Council is ―the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future 
employer member Clubs of the National Football League.‖  Id.; see also Pollack, supra note 
78, at 1711 (discussing the importance of the limited role of a commissioner in labor 
negotiations, and, in particular, the preclusion of the NFL commissioner from labor 
negotiations). 
225 See generally Marks, supra note 131, at 1593–1601 (discussing whether the Conduct 
Policy was unilaterally implemented and if the NFLPA would have any judicial recourse). 
226 See Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123 (detailing Goodell‘s reasoning behind 
the suspensions of Adam Jones and Chris Henry); Battista, Problem Players, supra note 122 
(discussing the suspension of Adam Jones and Goodell‘s response that the misconduct 
taints the reputation of the NFL); Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 
26 (explaining that Goodell viewed the Conduct Policy as the next step in ensuring that 
players continue to uphold the higher standard of responsible conduct to which all 
members of the NFL are held).  In a letter written to the suspended players, Goodell wrote 
the following:  ―Your conduct has brought embarrassment and ridicule upon yourself, your 
club and the N.F.L., and has damaged the reputation of players throughout the 
league . . . . You have engaged in conduct detrimental to the N.F.L. and failed to live up to 
the standards expected of N.F.L. players.‖  Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123. 
227 See Marks, supra note 131, at 1596 (stating that a valid reason for the Conduct Policy is 
―to better the reputation and public opinion of the NFL and its players‖); supra Part II.B.1.d 
(discussing behavior that is detrimental to the NFL and can result in discipline under the 
authority given to the Commissioner by the Policy). 
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any bona fide bargaining or quid pro quo for the NFLPA.228  The ―best 
interests‖ authority of Goodell may preclude any such benefit, leaving 
the players without practical appeal rights. 
C. ―Best Interests‖ Authority in Professional Sports 
The authority granted to the NFL commissioner to discipline for 
conduct that is detrimental to, or not in the best interests of the League 
and the sport itself is common among all governing documents in the 
NFL.229  Commissioner Goodell, like past NFL commissioners, has used 
this authority to justify his disciplinary decisions.230  Still, it is not clear 
what type of conduct is contrary to ―best interests.‖231  Other sports have 
defined ―best interests‖ broadly and subjectively, giving great discretion 
to the commissioner.232 
                                                 
228 See Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615–16 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing 
the absence of bona-fide bargaining and any benefit for the NFLPA in the promulgation of 
the Rozelle Rule); supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of negotiation 
that preceded the implementation of the Conduct Policy). 
229 NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 253.  The Player Contract reminds a player that 
the success of the NFL depends on public respect for the league and that any conduct that 
damages the integrity or public confidence in the game will be sanctioned upon the 
reasonable judgment of the NFL Commissioner.  Id.; NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29.  
The Constitution gives the commissioner the following best interests authority: 
The Commissioner is authorized . . . to hire legal counsel and take or 
adopt appropriate legal action or such other steps or procedures as he 
deems necessary and proper in the best interests of either the League 
or professional football, whenever any party or organization not a 
member of, employed by, or connected with the League or any 
member thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental either to the 
League, its member clubs or employees, or to professional football. 
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29; see also supra Part II.B.1.c (discussing the authority to 
discipline for detrimental conduct under the NFL CBA). 
230 See Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, 203 
N.L.R.B. 958, 959 (1973) (discussing the concession that Commissioner Rozelle had the 
authority to fine players for conduct detrimental to football in the context of the 
promulgation of the Rozelle Rule); supra note 23 (discussing Goodell‘s use of the Conduct 
Policy to discipline players for conduct that is damaging to the reputation of the NFL). 
231 See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1411 (discussing the conduct that falls in the ―grayer 
area‖ between definite detrimental conduct and conduct that does not offend the league‘s 
best interests).  Conduct in the gray area provokes the question of whether players should 
subject themselves to the complete disciplinary authority of the commissioner and give up 
personal rights in exchange for the privilege to play in the league.  Id. 
232 See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the commissioner 
was given the unambiguous authority to determine if any action is in the best interests of 
the game); Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222–26 
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (explaining that it was within his authority under the Major League 
Agreement for the MLB Commissioner to suspend the chief executive of the Atlanta 
Braves, Ted Turner); Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) 
(holding that the agreement within the League created a commissioner‘s office with the 
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The office of the MLB Commissioner was created in a way that gave 
the holder of the position ―all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute 
despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater 
familias.‖233  Attempts to curtail this authority have not succeeded 
because courts recognized that the chartering language of the League 
clearly showed that the parties intended the commissioner to wield 
expansive authority to protect the best interests of the League.234  The 
language in the operating agreement of the NFL regarding ―best 
interests‖ authority is similar to that of the MLB agreements.235  Both 
leagues allow for the commissioner to supersede grievance procedures 
when a grievance is filed in response to discipline for detrimental 
conduct.236  In practice, however, the MLB Commissioner has refrained 
from using that authority at times, allowing the players an independent 
appeal.237  Furthermore, the NBA and the MLB do not have separate 
player conduct policies similar to the NFL‘s, which more closely define 
                                                                                                             
characteristics of ―a benevolent but absolute despot‖).  But see Prof‘l Sports, Ltd. v. Va. 
Squires Basketball Club, Ltd. P‘ship, 373 F. Supp. 946, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that 
the commissioner was given authority to arbitrate disputes between clubs, but that there 
was not the same authority to arbitrate commissioner-created disputes).  For example, see 
HOLTZMAN, supra note 147, at 186, which discusses former MLB Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn‘s assertion that the governing documents of the League did not establish an objective 
standard in measuring ―best interests‖ authority. 
233 Landis, 49 F.2d at 299; Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a).  The 
Major League Agreement provides for the punishment of conduct that violates the ―best 
interests‖ of the League.  Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a). 
234 See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1420–29 (discussing the judicial review of commissioner 
actions under the ―best interests‖ authority).  The conflict between Pete Rose and MLB 
Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti represents a recent example of the exercise of the "best 
interests" clause.  Id.  Although it was resolved in a settlement prior to adjudication, 
Giamatti‘s actions in investigating gambling allegations against Rose reinforced the wide-
ranging use of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority for the best interests of the game.  
Id. 
235 Compare Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a) (explaining that the 
commissioner has the authority to discipline any player, coach, or other league official for 
conduct ―detrimental to the best interests of the national game of base ball‖), with 
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (authorizing the commissioner to discipline for 
―conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional 
football‖). 
236 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32–33 (giving the commissioner the authority to 
hear all appeals of discipline resulting from conduct detrimental to the integrity of and 
public confidence in the game); supra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that although the NFL CBA 
does contain a section on a non-injury grievance procedure, it is superseded by the 
commissioner‘s disciplinary authority under article XII). 
237 See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining that Commissioner Bud Selig disciplined Kenny 
Rogers in a way that allowed Rogers to appeal to an independent arbitrator under the 
league grievance procedure); see also MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 128 (discussing 
Commissioner Selig‘s reluctance to utilize his authority to prevent the use of the grievance 
procedure when conduct was deemed detrimental to the game). 
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detrimental conduct and reiterate the commissioner‘s authority in that 
area.238 
The expansive scope of the NFL commissioner‘s authority has been 
questioned but courts have yet to expressly limit the breadth of his ―best 
interests‖ authority.239  So long as a commissioner, with no standard for 
review, acts within the scope of the authority granted to him under a 
sport‘s operating agreement, courts have not overturned commissioner 
decisions.240  This means Commissioner Goodell has a magnitude of 
authority analogous to that given in theory to the commissioner of the 
MLB; that is, the authority of a benevolent despot.241  To counter such 
authority and partiality, the NFLPA must negotiate an independent 
arbitration process in the new CBA that contains a defined standard of 
review similar to one found in NBA or MLB procedures with which to 
assess disciplinary decisions for off-field misconduct. 
D. Standards of Review 
Arbitrators in general evaluate the disciplinary decisions of 
commissioners based on the guidelines provided in the operating 
                                                 
238 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 1 (requiring NFL players to refrain from 
detrimental conduct); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the NBA Commissioner‘s authority to 
discipline for detrimental conduct). 
239 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 15–16 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(acknowledging that the commissioner had the authority to fine players for conduct 
detrimental to the NFL without directly holding the Rozelle Rule to be outside the scope of 
that authority); Dryer v. L.A. Rams, 709 P.2d 826, 832–33 (Cal. 1985) (refraining from 
limiting the best interests authority of the commissioner while holding that the case 
involved a contract dispute and not a disciplinary decision so the commissioner could not 
invoke his best interests power). 
240 See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that MLB 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn‘s nullification of the sale of three players was upheld pursuant 
to the authority granted by the League‘s operating agreement).  The court stated that ―[t]he 
Commissioner has been given broad power in unambiguous language to investigate any 
act, transaction or practice not in the best interests of baseball, to determine what 
preventive, remedial or punitive action is appropriate in the premises, and to take that 
action.‖  Id. at 534.  The court recognized that assessing the best interests of the game 
required some expertise that the judiciary did not have.  Id. at 537.  The commissioner had 
the requisite expertise; therefore, he was entrusted to discipline.  Id.  The court would not 
decide if the commissioner‘s decision was right or wrong, only if it was within the 
language of the agreement and not arbitrary or capricious.  Id. at 539 n.44; see also Atlanta 
Nat‘l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (recognizing 
that a determination of what is in the best interests of baseball is not for courts to decide 
and that the commissioner had the authority under the operating agreement to hand down 
the punishment); Pollack, supra note 78, at 1679–85 (discussing the judicial deference shown 
to the best interests authority in the case Finley v. Kuhn); supra text accompanying note 169 
(discussing the appropriateness of the arbitrary or capricious standard in such cases). 
241 See Landis, supra note 135 (discussing the court‘s holding that the commissioner was 
given broad authority). 
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agreements.242  If a commissioner‘s decision violates the standard of 
review, the arbitrator will reduce or rescind the punishment.243  
Maintaining the fundamental fairness of a disciplinary decision, 
analogous to principles of industrial due process, is important even 
when ―best interests‖ and deterrence are the objectives.244 
In the NFL operating agreement, a commissioner is instructed only 
to use his ―best interests‖ discretion and discipline based on a series of 
factors.245  In contrast, other professional sports leagues utilize standards 
of review such as ―just cause‖ and ―arbitrary and capricious.‖246  The 
NBA CBA provides for the use of the ―just cause‖ standard in grievance 
procedures when punishments are not severe.247  The MLB CBA requires 
the grievance arbitrator to use the same ―just cause‖ standard of review, 
reflecting the idea that the commissioner maintains a certain amount of 
discretion and that the discipline should equal the offense.248  In practice, 
the standard of review has been successful in each league, both 
upholding and shortening suspensions.249 
                                                 
242 See supra Part II.B (discussing the standards of review that leagues incorporate into 
their operating agreements). 
243 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the MLB arbitrator‘s reduction of the punishment of 
Kenny Rogers). 
244 See In re Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel. Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors 
Basketball Club & Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 86 (2000) (Feerick, Arb.) (holding that fairness in 
discipline is like standards of industrial due process); see also MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note 
141 (explaining that principles of fairness should not be ignored in order to achieve 
deterrence).  See generally Raymond L. Hogler, Industrial Due Process and Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 31 LAB. L.J. 570 (1980) (discussing that within industrial due process, an 
employee must be given the opportunity to present his or her side of a case before being 
discharged by an employer). 
245 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3 (listing the factors the commissioner 
should analyze disciplining first-time or repeat offenders).  ―The specifics of the 
disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the incident, the actual or threatened 
risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional misconduct (whether or not 
criminal charges were filed), and other relevant factors.‖  Id. at 2; see also supra Part III.C 
(discussing the ―best interests‖ discretionary authority given to the NFL commissioner 
under the League‘s operating agreements). 
246 See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 327 (stating when an arbitrary 
and capricious standard should be used); supra note 141 (discussing the just cause standard 
of review used by arbitrators in MLB disciplinary cases). 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 167–69 (explaining how the severity of the 
punishment by the commissioner may determine the appellate procedure available to the 
player). 
248 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43; see also MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note 141 
(explaining that just cause standards include determining if the punishment was 
appropriate considering the offense). 
249 See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04-CV-9528(GBD), 
2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (holding that a suspension was without just cause); 
Brown, supra note 155 (stating that an arbitrator found the suspension excessive under a 
just cause standard); Peter Gammons, Suspended Romero ‗Didn‘t Cheat,‘ ESPN (Jan. 6, 2009, 
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A commissioner must meet a high burden when justifying his 
disciplinary decisions because his decision can hinder a player‘s 
employment in that sport.250  That commissioner‘s decision, therefore, 
must be strictly scrutinized so as to prevent a player‘s exclusion from 
employment in an entire industry.251  The NBA CBA does this by 
requiring arbitrators to use an ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of 
review in cases of more severe discipline.252  The NFL CBA, also able to 
prevent employment in an entire industry, does not make an allowance 
for more severe punishments.253  Recent punishments in the NFL that 
restrict personal freedoms should require, at the very least, an applicable 
standard of review like that in the NBA.254 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Clymer, the court, presented with an 
arbitration agreement that provided for the use of two different 
standards of review, found the agreement ambiguous and construed it 
against the party bringing the claim.255  The NFL CBA fails to define a 
standard of review applicable for any level of commissioner discipline.256  
This language may be held ambiguous because it leaves the 
commissioner with no guidance and only his own interpretation.257  
Under judicial holdings, a court may not overturn the commissioner‘s 
interpretation as to the proper standard of review under the agreement 
because of a difference in opinion.258  Therefore, without a defined 
                                                                                                             
1:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3812334 (reporting that J.C. 
Romero‘s fifty-game suspension for steroid use was upheld in arbitration). 
250 See MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note 141 (explaining that a commissioner in a 
professional sports league has control over a player‘s employment that employers in other 
industries do not have). 
251 See id. (explaining why a commissioner in professional sports must justify disciplinary 
decisions using a standard higher than in other industries). 
252 Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 327. 
253 See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the NFL CBA does not provide a defined 
standard of review). 
254 See Weistart, supra note 67, at 734 (explaining that the basic inquiry to be made 
regarding a punishment is one of reasonableness).  Although a professional sports league 
should have the ability to punish players, rigid rules of personal conduct should be 
balanced against personal freedoms to ensure reasonable punishment.  Id. at 731–34; see also 
NFL Aims to Tackle Public Relations Problem of Player Arrests!, supra note 122 (discussing the 
punishment of Adam Jones that included a curfew and prevented Jones from going to 
night clubs). 
255 No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *2, *7 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1993). 
256 See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating only that the commissioner or 
his designee will preside at a hearing and issue a final written decision); supra Part II.B.1.c 
(describing the NFL CBA‘s guidelines for the implementation of commissioner discipline). 
257 See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that an arbitrator interprets an 
arbitration agreement). 
258 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); see 
also United Paperworkers Int‘l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987) (holding that a 
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standard like one found in the NBA or MLB, the NFL commissioner is 
free to determine how to review appeals of imposed punishment.259  The 
absence of a defined standard, one of several differences among the NFL 
appeals procedures and the NBA and MLB appeals procedures, reduces 
the procedural protections for players.260 
E. Comparison of the Appellate Procedures Among Professional Sports 
Leagues 
The NFL, NBA, and MLB each use different appeal procedures 
depending on which governing document is used to discipline a 
player.261  In the NBA and MLB, it is clear that when the commissioner 
disciplines a player, that player may have his appeal heard by an 
arbitrator under the grievance procedures.262  In fact, the NBA recognizes 
that independent arbitrators should handle the appeals of more severe 
punishments.263  Conversely, a NFL player disciplined for off-field 
conduct by the commissioner may only appeal to the commissioner.264  
The NFL does not even entertain the possibility of an alternative 
                                                                                                             
court should not reject the factual findings or the interpretation of the contract by an 
arbitrator even if it is based on a mistake of law); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the holdings 
that help define judicial review of arbitration awards). 
259 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3 (discussing only factors for initial 
determination of a possible punishment).  The Conduct Policy does not give an exact 
standard of review and states that the commissioner has the ―authority to impose 
discipline as warranted.‖  Id. at 2. 
260 See Weistart, supra note 67, at 715 (discussing standards of proof in the context of 
required procedural protections). 
261 See supra Part II.B (discussing the disciplinary structure of each league under its 
operating agreement). 
262 See supra note 162 (discussing cases in which NBA players had punishments from the 
commissioner reduced by an independent arbitrator through the grievance procedure in 
the NBA CBA); supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the situation in which MLB Commissioner 
Selig chose to discipline Kenny Rogers under a section of the MLB CBA that allowed 
Rogers to appeal to an independent arbitrator); see also Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra 
note 162, at 330 (explaining that the NBA‘s grievance procedures will follow the Labor 
Arbitration Rules of the AAA). 
263 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating that where 
the deprivation of fundamental rights and liberties are at stake, the procedural protection 
provided should be ―appropriate to the nature of the case‖); supra text accompanying notes 
167–69 (discussing the provision in the NBA CBA that requires appeals of punishments 
resulting in a loss of more than $50,000 to be heard as provided by the grievance 
procedure). 
264 See supra Part II.B.1.c–d (explaining that under both the NFL CBA and the Personal 
Conduct Policy, NFL players disciplined by the commissioner for detrimental off-field 
conduct can only appeal the decision to the commissioner or his designee). 
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grievance procedure in more severe cases despite several lengthy 
suspensions that have prevented player employment.265 
In terms of discovery, courts have supported the specific FAA 
guidelines that serve not only to clarify the process but also to assure 
that each party can present an efficient appeal.266  The collective 
bargaining agreements of the NBA and MLB contain specific guidelines 
for discovery.267  Both describe which documents must be produced 
upon request; the MLB CBA also details the arbitrator‘s role in deciding 
the relevance of the evidence.268  The language of the CBAs would 
eliminate the ambiguity that exists in the NFL CBA and is more akin to 
the position of courts.269 
The NFL CBA outlines the procedures for discipline, but the 
processes for an appeal to the commissioner lack the definition needed to 
meet a reasonableness standard.270  The NFL CBA lacks specificity in 
regard to an appeal to the commissioner, stating that one may present 
relevant evidence with no mention of discovery guidelines.271  The 
precedence of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and the severity 
of the punishments warrant stronger procedural protections for 
discovery.272 
Furthermore, the method in the NFL for choosing the third-party 
judge for the appeal of a commissioner‘s disciplinary decision is much 
                                                 
265 See Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123 (discussing the season-long suspension 
of Adam Jones and the eight-game suspension of Chris Henry); supra Part II.B.1.d 
(explaining that a hearing before the commissioner is the only appellate right available to 
players that are disciplined under the Personal Conduct Policy). 
266 See supra note 44 (discussing section 7 of the FAA and citing cases that develop the 
discovery authority of an arbitrator before and during an arbitration proceeding). 
267 See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 330–31 (explaining that a party to 
the arbitration has the right to discovery of all non-privileged documents from the 
opposing party); MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 44 (stating that all documents from 
an investigation are subject to the right of discovery). 
268 See MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 227 (explaining that the lead arbitrator on 
the arbitration panel is responsible for determining the relevancy and materiality of the 
evidence presented). 
269 See supra note 44 (discussing courts‘ holdings regarding discovery guidelines in 
arbitration proceedings). 
270 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34–35; Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 19–22; 
see also Weistart, supra note 67 (discussing the reasonableness standard for required 
procedural safeguards). 
271 See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35 (stating that a party to the hearing may 
―present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to the hearing‖). 
272 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (explaining that a 
more severe punishment requires stronger procedural protection); Commissioner Discipline, 
supra note 9, at 35 (stating that the commissioner‘s disciplinary decisions supersede those of 
the owners or teams); supra note 26 (discussing the increased severity of punishments that 
Goodell has imposed). 
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different than that in the other leagues.273  In the NFL, the commissioner 
or a designee of the commissioner presides over the appellate hearing, 
with the NFLPA consulting as to who will serve as the commissioner‘s 
designee for the season.274  The NFL commissioner generally still 
presides over the hearing and is responsible for final decisions in every 
case, which abates the procedural safeguard provided by possibly 
having a designee serve as the arbitrator to a dispute.275  On the contrary, 
the NBA and MLB name an independent arbitrator chosen through a 
process that protects the rights of both parties, occasionally with 
assistance from outside organizations.276  The NBA disqualifies 
arbitrators who have a previous business relationship with any 
professional athletes or leagues.277  The NFL needs to recognize the 
importance of the impartiality of a third-party arbitrator, just as the NBA 
and MLB do.  Subsequently, the NFL should amend the CBA so that it 
contains an independent arbitration process that enhances the 
procedural protections and appeal rights of players.  
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The Personal Conduct Policy in the NFL vests the commissioner 
with disciplinary authority that is too broad and limits the rights of 
players to appeal.278  It does not contain reasonably defined procedures 
or a standard of review.279  Instead, it calls for a partial commissioner not 
                                                 
273 Compare Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating that either the 
commissioner or the commissioner‘s designee will preside over appellate hearings), with 
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 35 (explaining the MLB procedure for selecting an 
impartial arbitrator), and Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333–34 
(discussing the selection of an independent grievance arbitrator under the NBA CBA). 
274 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34. 
275 See id. (explaining that at the conclusion of an appellate hearing, the commissioner 
issues a written decision that is the final and complete decision); supra Part II.B.1.c 
(showing that the commissioner by and large presides over any appellate hearing for 
discipline issued under the Personal Conduct Policy). 
276 See MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 35 (discussing the procedure delineated in 
the MLB CBA for choosing an independent arbitrator); Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, 
supra note 162 (explaining the method for selecting an arbitrator under the NBA CBA); 
supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the independent arbitration procedure in the MLB‘s 
disciplinary structure); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the independent arbitration procedure 
in the NBA‘s disciplinary structure). 
277 See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333–34 (stating that the NBA CBA 
requires all potential arbitrators to be free of certain recent business relationships). 
278 See supra Part III (analyzing the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and the 
implementation of the Personal Conduct Policy). 
279 See supra Part III.E (comparing the procedural protections in the NFL disciplinary 
structure with those found in the NBA and MLB); supra Part III.D (explaining that the 
Policy fails to properly define an exact standard of review). 
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only to impose punishments but also to review the validity of those 
punishments.280  Finally, the Policy furthers the already expansive ―best 
interests‖ authority and constitutes a working condition that was not 
collectively bargained.281  Consequently, this Note suggests 
incorporating into the new NFL CBA an amended Personal Conduct 
Policy to both increase procedural protections and include an 
independent arbitration procedure. 
A. Incorporate the Personal Conduct Policy into the New NFL CBA 
The first step in amending the CBA would be to create a new article 
for the Personal Conduct Policy following Article XI, Commissioner 
Discipline, in the CBA.  The current Policy is a stricter version of a 
previous conduct policy that was put in place to deter off-field 
detrimental misconduct.282  It was written and put into action by 
Commissioner Goodell with only the acquiescence of the NFLPA in 
apparent violation of the NLRA.283  Goodell assumed a duty that was not 
his and created rules that affect the working conditions of NFL players 
without including the NFLPA in a collective bargaining discussion.284 
By incorporating the Conduct Policy into the CBA, there would no 
longer be any question of violating standard labor and collective 
bargaining practices because it would no longer be the result of 
unilateral implementation.  The NFLPA and League Management would 
engage in the bona fide bargaining required when a working condition is 
affected.285  At the very least, by having the chance to collectively bargain 
for its incorporation and its terms, the NFLPA could receive a quid pro 
quo for its acquiescence to the Policy.286 
Opponents may argue that the Policy was properly promulgated 
because owners were involved in the creation of the first Conduct Policy 
                                                 
280 See supra Part III.A (discussing the requirements of impartiality in an appellate 
procedure in the context of the commissioner‘s role as arbiter of disputes). 
281 See supra Part III.C (discussing the best interests authority given to commissioners in 
professional sports); supra Part III.B (discussing the unilateral implementation of the 
Conduct Policy and whether it is a working condition promulgated absent collective 
bargaining). 
282 See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the creation of the original policy and the current 
Conduct Policy). 
283 See supra Part III.B (discussing how Commissioner Goodell was the driving force 
behind the Conduct Policy); supra text accompanying note 26 (explaining that the Conduct 
Policy was implemented without any negotiation). 
284 See supra Part III.B (explaining that rules that affect working conditions are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining). 
285 See supra Part III.B (discussing required steps for the implementation of rules). 
286 See Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing the 
absent quid pro quo for the NFLPA in the promulgation of the Rozelle Rule). 
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and, thus, there is no need to include the new Conduct Policy in the 
CBA.287  Nevertheless, Commissioner Goodell‘s efforts created the 
current Conduct Policy that punishes player conduct short of criminal 
behavior.288  It even uses the grievance procedures of the CBA in a way 
that was not contemplated in collective bargaining.289 
B. Amend the Hearing Rights in the Personal Conduct Policy 
The next step following the incorporation of the Personal Conduct 
Policy must be to amend the language of the section entitled ―Hearing 
Rights‖ to include a two-tiered procedure determined by the severity of 
the disputed punishment imposed by the commissioner.290  The 
procedure would utilize either the commissioner as the arbitrator or an 
independent arbitration panel.  The amended section appears as follows, 
with the author‘s commentary intertwined. 
Proposed Amendment to ―Hearing Rights‖ in Personal 
Conduct Policy291 
 
Persons filing an appeal shall be entitled to a prompt 
hearing pursuant to the following procedure: 
a) A dispute involving an action taken by the 
Commissioner under this article (i) concerning 
conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public 
confidence in the NFL and (ii) resulting in a financial 
impact of the equivalent of one (1) punished player‘s 
game check or less shall be subject exclusively to a 
hearing before the Commissioner or his designee 
under the procedures set forth in Article XI.  The 
Commissioner will choose his designee with the 
approval of the Executive Director of the NFLPA. 
b) A dispute involving an action taken by the 
Commissioner under this article (i) concerning 
                                                 
287 See supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing the creation of the Conduct Policy in 
2000). 
288 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(explaining that the commissioner should consult with both parties in the promulgation of 
a rule); New Commish Goodell Gets Tough, supra note 123 (citing examples of how 
Commissioner Goodell strengthened the player conduct policy). 
289 See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that hearings shall be held 
―pursuant to Article XI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement‖). 
290 Id. 
291 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  The 
language in regular font is taken from the NFL Personal Conduct Policy.  See generally 
Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3. 
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conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public 
confidence in the NFL and (ii) resulting in a financial 
impact of more than the equivalent of one (1) 
punished player‘s game check shall be subject 
exclusively to a hearing before an arbitration panel 
consisting of three (3) arbitrators under the 
procedures set forth in Article IX §§ 2, 3, 5, and 8.  
The arbitrators will be selected as follows: 
A) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the 
Commissioner from a list of arbitrators 
provided by the American Arbitration 
Association. 
B) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the NFLPA 
from a list of arbitrators provided by the 
American Arbitration Association. 
C) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the NFL 
Management Council from a list of 
arbitrators provided by the American 
Arbitration Association. 
D) None of the selected arbitrators shall violate 
the neutrality and impartiality requirements 
as listed in the American Arbitration 
Association Labor Arbitration Rules. 
Commentary 
Amending the hearing rights section of the Conduct Policy with a 
new two-tiered dispute resolution procedure will ensure impartiality, 
limit the best interests authority of the commissioner, and protect 
players‘ rights in cases involving severe punishments.292  Inserting the 
appeal procedure directly into the Conduct Policy defines the process 
better than simply referencing a process in another section of the CBA.  
This will allow independent arbitrators to moderate discipline imposed 
by a commissioner in a way analogous to the successful procedures in 
the NBA and MLB.293 
The new procedure prevents the evident partiality that resulted from 
the commissioner arbitrating the validity of his own decisions.294  In 
most cases of discipline, it will eliminate two relationships that could 
                                                 
292 See supra Part III (analyzing the requirements of reasonable procedures and 
impartiality as well as the best interests authority of the commissioner). 
293 See supra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the grievance procedures in the MLB and the NBA). 
294 See supra Part III.A (discussing the commissioner‘s role in reviewing his disputes and 
the standard of evident partiality). 
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compromise impartiality:  a material relationship between the presiding 
arbitrator and an involved party and a financial and representative 
relationship between the commissioner and NFL management.295  
Furthermore, the addition of this appeal procedure will validate any 
foreseeable partiality that exists when the commissioner presides over 
disputes involving less severe punishments because it will now be the 
result of collective bargaining.296 
Section (b)(D), requiring the selected arbitrators to meet neutrality 
requirements, further ensures the arbitration panel‘s impartiality.297  
Adherence to AAA Labor Arbitration Rules precludes any financial 
relationship between the arbitrators and the parties.298  Furthermore, 
sections (b)(A)–(C) prevent bias by allowing each party to the collective 
bargaining agreement—the NFLPA, the NFL Management Council, and 
the commissioner—to choose a member of the panel.299 
By limiting the discretion and the appellate purview of the 
commissioner, the new procedure will diminish the problem of 
unchecked ―best interests‖ authority.300  Instead, an independent panel 
will determine whether the punishment, under the applicable standard 
of review, is a valid exercise of the commissioner‘s authority.301  
Moreover, stopping the commissioner from superseding the grievance 
                                                 
295 See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that evident partiality exists when an arbitrator‘s 
corporation has a financial relationship with an involved party‘s corporation); supra text 
accompanying note 80 (explaining that a material relationship between the arbitrator and a 
party is evidence of partiality); supra Part III.A (explaining that the commissioner is a party 
to the dispute over which he presides and discussing the financial relationship between the 
commissioner and management). 
296 See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 
968 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 
2009) (explaining that the parties agreed to the foreseeable partiality when they collectively 
bargained for the position). 
297 This clause is similar in intent to Article XXXI § 6(b) of the NBA CBA.  See 
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333 (stating that selected grievance 
arbitrators may not have professional relationships with professional athletes or leagues in 
the preceding five years). 
298 See Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 5, 11 (discussing the neutrality 
requirements of the AAA Labor arbitration rules).  ―No person shall serve as a neutral 
arbitrator in any arbitration . . . in which that person has any financial or personal interest 
in the result of the arbitration.‖  Id. § 17. 
299 See Preamble, supra note 109, at 3 (stating that the NFLPA represents the players and 
that the NFL Management Council represents the league in the collective bargaining 
process). 
300 Courts will not overturn a commissioner‘s decisions that are justified by the best 
interests authority in operating agreements.  See supra Part III.C (discussing judicial 
responses to best interests authority in the NFL and MLB). 
301 See infra Part IV.C (defining the proposed standard of review to be amended to the 
Policy). 
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procedure guarantees that most of the commissioner‘s ―best interests‖ 
decisions will be reviewable.302 
The current procedural protections and appeal rights of players do 
not differ with the severity of the punishment.303  The two-tiered 
approach would establish increased appeal rights when the imposed 
punishment is more severe.  Because the value of one game check is the 
threshold, minimal punishment is still controlled by the commissioner.  
More severe punishments should be subject to review by an independent 
arbitration panel because the NFL commissioner can limit or prohibit a 
player‘s employment in the entire industry of football.304  As 
punishments escalate in severity towards banishment, the need for 
independent review and procedures increase.305 
C. Define Procedural Protections and Standards of Review 
The final step will be to define the procedures of the appeal process 
to satisfy a reasonableness standard and to implement a standard of 
review for either the commissioner or the arbitration panel to follow.  
The amendments proposed below provide specific guidelines for 
discovery as well as a standard of review for either prevailing appeal 
procedure.  The amended sections appear with the author‘s commentary: 
Proposed Amendment of ―Procedural Protections‖ to the 
Personal Conduct Policy306 
 
Discovery Guidelines 
(a) Each party will submit to the other involved parties copies 
of all non-privileged documents, reports, and records that 
are relevant to the action giving rise to, the investigation 
of, and the actual dispute. 
(b) A party may call witnesses to testify to non-privileged 
information relevant to the action giving rise to, the 
investigation of, and the actual dispute. 
(c) The person or panel presiding over the hearing shall 
determine the relevance of documents and testimony 
submitted under this section. 
                                                 
302 See supra text accompanying note 167 (explaining that professional leagues often 
incorporate a clause that would allow the commissioner to remove a dispute from an 
independent grievance procedure). 
303 See supra Part III.E (analyzing the procedural protections of the NFL). 
304 See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing the NFL commissioner‘s authority to discipline). 
305 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
306 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. 
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(d) Parties shall adhere to all other discovery guidelines 
pursuant to Article IX § 5 that do not conflict with any of 
the language in this Policy. 
Commentary 
The proposed section would expand on the current ―any evidence 
relevant‖ explanation to provide clear instructions for discovery 
resembling those in a judicial proceeding.307  The present guidelines 
simply are not adequate when the commissioner‘s disciplinary decisions 
supersede all other discipline and can even include banishment.308  The 
proposed guidelines will adhere to judicial holdings that provide for 
defined discovery in arbitration cases.309 
Clauses (c) and (d) under the Discovery Guidelines will expedite any 
extended discovery or disputes over discoverable evidence.  Clause (c) 
puts the arbitrator in the role of resolving relevance, preventing 
discovery disputes from being part of the arbitration process.  Clause (d) 
preserves the existing non-conflicting provisions in the CBA because it 
uses the reasonable time requirements for discovery.310  It also precludes 
a party‘s use of evidence that was not submitted to the other party.311  
Each clause is necessary for an efficient discovery process. 
Proposed Amendment of ―Standards of Review‖ to the 
Personal Conduct Policy312 
 
Standard of Review 
(a) The party or arbitration panel presiding over a dispute 
shall apply a ―just cause‖ standard of review in deciding 
the propriety of the punishment. 
(b) The party or arbitration panel applying the ―just cause‖ 
standard of review shall determine whether the magnitude 
of punishment was commensurate with the conduct 
giving rise to the punishment. 
                                                 
307 Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35. 
308 See supra Part III.E (discussing the lack of reasonable discovery guidelines in the 
Conduct Policy). 
309 See supra note 44 (discussing the judicial intervention that has compelled discovery in 
cases of arbitration). 
310 See Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 24 (stating that all relevant documents 
must be submitted no later than ten days prior to the hearing). 
311 See id. (explaining when documents may or may not be used in an arbitration 
proceeding if discovery deadlines are not met). 
312 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. 
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Commentary 
The implementation of a defined standard of review ensures 
fundamental fairness in the punishment of players and is increasingly 
important because the length and severity of punishments have 
increased under the Policy.313  Instead of relying on an arbitrator‘s 
discretion, there will be a defined guideline for choosing to modify or 
overturn a punishment.314  The section will also provide the 
commissioner a standard of reference in imposing discipline. 
Just cause is the proper standard of review because it holds the 
commissioner to a reasonableness standard.315  An arbitrary and 
capricious standard, while successfully used in the NBA, is less clear and 
that ambiguity would not substantially limit the commissioner‘s 
authority to impose punishments.316  Just cause is a more precise 
standard that will require the presiding arbitrator to evaluate the dispute 
in the circumstances.317  The inclusion of sections (a) and (b) assures that 
the arbitrator will properly assess both the imposition of discipline as 
well as the magnitude of the punishment.  Thus, this standard of review 
will eradicate the ambiguity that can lead to judicial intervention in 
arbitration proceedings.318 
Following these steps to amend and incorporate the Personal 
Conduct Policy will result in a disciplinary system that includes 
reasonable procedural protections and an impartial arbitrator.  It will 
benefit players by increasing their appeal rights to a level better suited to 
coexist with the authority of the commissioner to completely prohibit a 
player‘s employment in an entire industry.319  The main argument 
against the proposed change to the Policy and the new CBA is that it 
would revoke the singular authority of the commissioner to properly 
punish, deter, and prevent detrimental and criminal conduct by NFL 
players, an authority even more necessary in an image-conscious 
                                                 
313 See supra Part III.D (analyzing the role of standards of review in professional sports 
coinciding with the increase in the severity of discipline). 
314 See supra Part III.D (explaining that the present Conduct Policy only calls for the use of 
the commissioner‘s discretion). 
315 Reasonableness is also similar to the requirements for other procedural protections.  
See supra text accompanying note 141 (explaining the just cause standard of review and 
how it has been used in practice). 
316 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review in the NBA). 
317 See supra Part III.D (analyzing the use of the just cause standard). 
318 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clymer, No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *2, *7 (E.D. 
Pa. July 1, 1993) (holding that the use of two different standards of review was ambiguous 
and ordering a modification of the award). 
319 See supra Part II.B.1.b–c (explaining that players may only appeal disputes to the 
commissioner who has expansive authority to impose discipline). 
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industry.320  However, the language that authorizes Commissioner 
Goodell‘s disciplinary authority for certain conduct will not change nor 
will the NFL‘s ability to protect its image.  An arbitrator could just as 
easily uphold a severe punishment for highly publicized misconduct as 
it could overturn the punishment so long as there was just cause.  The 
change will eliminate Goodell‘s authority to enforce punishments 
without proper procedure and just cause.  As a result of the 
amendments, the Personal Conduct Policy will become a joint action to 
deter detrimental and criminal conduct, collectively agreed by the 
commissioner, NFL management, and the NFLPA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the NFL‘s current Personal Conduct Policy, Commissioner 
Roger Goodell has nearly unlimited authority to discipline players for 
detrimental off-field conduct and then preside over disputes involving 
those punishments.  There is no standard of review, and procedural 
protections for players are sparse.  Further, the present Policy is not the 
result of collective bargaining between the NFLPA and the NFL 
Management Council.  This is an apparent violation of NLRA standards 
because Goodell implemented the Conduct Policy himself, which 
affected player working conditions. 
Amending the Conduct Policy to include an independent arbitration 
procedure with a defined standard of review and discovery guidelines 
would solve these problems.  League management and the NFLPA 
should incorporate the amended document into the new NFL CBA 
through collective bargaining.  Amending the new CBA would establish 
a new impartial grievance procedure validated by bona fide bargaining.  
The commissioner would maintain authority to discipline in the best 
interests of the NFL, while players would receive a meaningful right of 
appeal to an impartial arbitrator rather than the empty right to ask the 
commissioner to reconsider the punishment he already granted. 
Returning to Player A and the charitable organizations hypothetical 
discussed in Part I, implementing the new Policy in the CBA would 
provide a better opportunity to reduce what was an excessive 
punishment.  Because the suspension of six games would easily result in 
a financial impact of greater than one game check, Player A could appeal 
to an independent arbitration panel.321  Further, he could call witnesses 
                                                 
320 See supra note 123 (discussing by comparison the increase in criminal conduct that 
motivated Commissioner Goodell to implement the current Conduct Policy). 
321 See supra Part IV.B (proposing under section (a)(ii) of the amendment that a dispute 
over a punishment resulting in the financial impact of more than one game check will be 
heard in front of an arbitration panel). 
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and introduce documents from the criminal investigation to show the 
arbitration panel that the punishment was improper under a ―just cause‖ 
standard of review.  An arbitration panel most likely would find that the 
punishment was not commensurate with the offense and significantly 
reduce Player A‘s suspension. 
The current NFL disciplinary structure for off-field player conduct 
gives the NFL Commissioner discretion to make the rules, punish 
misconduct, and review those punishments.  The source of this 
authority, the Personal Conduct Policy, was not bargained for but affects 
the working conditions of players as much as any other provision of the 
NFL CBA that resulted from collective bargaining.  The NFL and the 
NFLPA must rectify the unilaterally promulgated Personal Conduct 
Policy that makes the Commissioner an absolute despot with an 
unchallenged authority to respond to the conduct of NFL players. 
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